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A CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF 
TORTS 
G. Edward White* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A nuclear-generated plant in India, owned by a German corporation, 
has a malfunction, releasing toxic waste that causes injuries to numerous 
persons.  The Burmese government, in connection with foreign 
corporations located in Burma, allows Burmese children to perform 
menial labor under substandard working conditions.  Agents employed 
by the Columbian government kidnap a Columbian citizen residing in 
the United States and subsequently torture and kill him in Columbia.  
The French ambassador to the United States is assaulted by a French 
citizen on a street in the District of Columbia.  A messenger transferring 
funds from the government of Qatar to a New York bank is injured in an 
attempted robbery instituted by Syrian nationals.  A cruise ship catering 
to Japanese citizens is highjacked by terrorists, causing severe emotional 
distress to many of its passengers before the terrorists are eventually 
subdued.  The Queen of England, on a state visit to Boston, is accused of 
having made false and defamatory statements about a citizen of 
Northern Ireland.1  
In each of these scenarios, a “tort” has arguably been committed.  In 
all of them, the torts, assuming their requisite elements could be 
established, are actionable in most nations.  But for approximately two 
hundred years after the framing of the Constitution, such cases, when 
                                                 
*  David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Virginia 
School of Law.  My thanks to Caleb Nelson and Curtis Bradley for their comments on an 
earlier draft, and to William Parker and Joseph Green for research assistance.  An earlier 
draft of this Article was delivered as the Monsanto Lecture at Valparaiso University School 
of Law on October 20, 2005. 
1 Some of these scenarios are versions of actual cases; others are versions of historical 
incidents or hypotheticals posed by commentators.  I have changed the facts slightly to 
connect the incidents more closely to contemporary events.  See Respublica v. 
DeLongchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111 (1784); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d. 876 (2d Cir. 
1980); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); William R. Casto, The 
Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 
CONN. L. REV. 467, 491-95 (1986) (discussing the “Marbois” and “Van Berckel” incidents 
involving violations of the safe conduct of ambassadors or persons connected to their 
households); Harold Honju Koh, Commentary, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1829 (1998) (discussing immunity of “heads of state” from tort suits); 
Partial Justice for the Klinghoffers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1997, at A22 (discussing financial 
settlement of lawsuit arising out of the October 7, 1985 highjacking of the Italian cruise 
ship, Achille Lauro, by Palestinian terrorists in which a passenger, Leon Klinghoffer, was 
killed). 
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they involved parties who were not citizens of the United States, were 
almost never brought in American state or federal courts;2 this despite 
the presence of a provision in the Judiciary Act of 1789 which stated that 
the federal district courts should “also have cognizance, concurrent with 
the courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, 
of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States.”3  
The Alien Tort Statute’s (“ATS”) long years in limbo ended in 1980 
when the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit allowed 
it to be invoked in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,4 where two citizens of Paraguay 
sued a Paraguayan police official for allegedly torturing and killing one 
of their relatives in 1976.  The plaintiffs originally pursued a criminal 
action against the defendant in Paraguayan courts, which was still 
pending in 1978, when the defendant sold his house in Paraguay and 
entered the United States under a visitor’s visa.5  He was remaining 
there, beyond the terms of his visa, when his whereabouts were 
discovered by one of the plaintiffs, who informed the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (“INS”).6  The INS then arrested the defendant 
and detained him prior to a deportation hearing.7  While he was in 
custody awaiting that hearing, the plaintiffs served him with a 
                                                 
2 Two tort cases involving aliens were entertained by United States federal courts 
between 1795 and 1980.  In the first, Bolchos v. Darrel, a French privateer captured an enemy 
Spanish ship on the high seas and brought it into a South Carolina port.  3 F. Cas. 810, 810 
(D.S.C. 1795).  The ship was carrying slaves that a Spanish citizen had mortgaged to a 
British citizen.  Id.  Once the ship was in port, the British citizen’s agent, Darrel, seized and 
sold the slaves.  Id.  The privateer’s captain, Bolchos, claimed that the ship was a lawful 
prize and as such he was entitled to its cargo, including the slaves.  Id.  The South Carolina 
district court concluded that its jurisdiction over the case rested on admiralty and 
eventually held that the ship was a lawful prize and the privateer entitled to the proceeds.  
Id. at 811.  In the course of its opinion, the court also suggested that the ATS “gives this 
court concurrent jurisdiction . . . where an alien sues for a tort, in violation of the law of 
nations. . . .”  Id.  In the second, Adra v. Clift,  two aliens were involved in a child custody 
dispute in which a falsified passport had allegedly been obtained for the child.  195 F. 
Supp. 857, 859 (D. Md. 1961).  The court held that falsifying passports was a violation of the 
law of nations that gave it jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute.  Id. at 865. 
3 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 
(2000)).  The term “also” refers to the fact that Section 9 of the Judiciary Act also dealt with 
the admiralty and criminal jurisdiction of the federal courts.  The current version of the 
Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) provides that “the district courts shall have original jurisdiction 
of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or 
a treaty of the United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). 
4 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980). 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 878-79. 
7 Id. at 879. 
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complaint, claiming that United States courts had jurisdiction over torts 
“in violation of the law of nations,” and that deliberate torture was an 
example of such a tort.8  
The Second Circuit agreed.9  After setting forth the ATS and noting 
that “the usage of nations, judicial opinions and the works of jurists” 
revealed that “official torture is now prohibited by the law of nations,”10 
it concluded that the plaintiffs had made a prima facie case for “a 
tort . . . committed in violation of the law of nations,”11 and that their 
claim could be brought in an Article III court.  “The constitutional basis 
for the Alien Tort Statute,” the Second Circuit stated, was “the law of 
nations, which has always been part of the federal common law.” 12 
The Filartiga decision made three assumptions, all of which would 
become controversial.  The first was that the ATS required no enabling 
legislation because torts “in violation of the law of nations” were 
recognized in the common law when it was passed.13  The second was 
that, although torture was not regarded in 1789 as so heinous a violation 
of human rights as to offend against principles of international law, it 
had come to be so recognized, and the law of nations is understood as 
evolving over time.14  The third was that the “law of nations” in the ATS 
was regarded as “part of the federal common law.”15 
All three of those assumptions were up for grabs in the 2004 
Supreme Court case, Sosa v. Alavarez-Machain.16  In the interval between 
the Filartiga and Sosa cases, commentators had given considerable 
attention to two issues the cases had in common.  First, the content of 
“customary international law”—that portion of the “law of nations” 
                                                 
8 Id. at 878. 
9 Id. at 884. 
10 Id. 
11 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). 
12 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885. 
13 Id. at 885-86. 
14 Id. at 881, 884. 
15 Id. at 885. 
16 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004).  In Sosa, a group of Mexican nationals, including Jose Francisco 
Sosa, was hired by the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) to seize 
another Mexican national, Humberto Alvarez-Machain, who was under indictment for 
participating in the torture and murder of Enrique Camarena-Salazar, a DEA agent who 
had been captured in Mexico.  Id. at 2746.  Sosa’s group abducted Alvarez-Machain from 
his house in Mexico, held him overnight in a motel, and subsequently brought him to El 
Paso, Texas, where he was arrested.  Id.  After eventually being acquitted of the torture and 
murder charges, Alvarez-Machain sued Sosa under the ATS, alleging that his seizure and 
overnight detention was a violation of the law of nations.  Id. at 2747. 
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which was not the product of formal acts of governments, such as 
treaties—was characterized in Filartiga as “the usage of nations, judicial 
opinions and the works of jurists.” 17   The other was the status of 
customary international law in United States courts.  
The Sosa decision did not produce a resolution of either of those 
issues.  It did, however, advance a reading of the ATS that seems to limit 
the Filartiga court’s understanding of it.  After Sosa, it appears that 
whatever the sources of customary international law and whatever its 
status in American courts, the number of “tort[s] only, committed in 
violation of the law of nations” cognizable in American courts under the 
ATS is limited.18  
This Article is not primarily about the Sosa decision, but about its 
connection to the current status of the customary international law of 
torts in American courts.  The ATS is but one mechanism by which torts 
allegedly “in violation of the law of nations” might be the subject of 
litigation in federal or state courts in the United States. Other statutory 
mechanisms exist, such as the 1991 Torture Victim Protection Act, 19 
which is designed to cover situations such as Filartiga.  And, more 
fundamentally, American state or federal courts might conclude that 
customary international law doctrines should be incorporated into the 
corpus of their common law decisions.  If that were the case, the number 
of litigants seeking to bring customary international tort suits in United 
States courts might not, given the Sosa decision, significantly increase.  
But the content of American state and federal tort law might well 
change.  So it seems worthwhile at this juncture to look more closely into 
the content and status of a customary international law of torts. 
That inquiry is intimately connected to an understanding of the 
effect of the Court’s 1938 decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins20 on the 
jurisprudential status of customary international law.  Erie, which 
involved a domestic torts dispute, did not clarify whether its assertion 
that “[t]here is no general federal common law” was intended to apply to 
the law of nations.21  The law of nations had clearly been thought of as 
“general common law” prior to Erie and was based on international 
                                                 
17 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884. 
18 See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2770. 
19 Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992). 
20 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
21 Id. at 78. 
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customs and usages rather than state common law doctrines.22  One 
commentator, writing shortly after the Erie decision was handed down, 
argued that because most cases applying international law were brought 
in the federal courts and because the federal government arguably had a 
far stronger interest in the resolution of disputes affecting international 
relations than the states, it made no sense to apply Erie to international 
law disputes.23  
The issue is complicated by the fact that, after Erie, courts have 
recognized that the continuing existence of pockets of “federal common 
law” in areas governed by federal statutes whose terms require judicial 
interpretation. 24   Under this approach, the ATS could spawn, as it 
arguably did in Filartiga, some “federal common law” decisions 
interpreting its coverage. But this leaves open the question of the status 
of customary international law in cases not governed by the ATS.  If, as 
appears likely,25 Sosa anticipates a case-by-case determination of that 
question, that determination seems fated to eventually confront the issue 
of whether Erie should apply to international law cases. 
Formulated more precisely, the status of a customary international 
law of torts in American courts would seem to turn on a threefold 
inquiry.  First, Filartiga and Sosa, taken together, make it clear that the 
ATS creates jurisdiction in the federal courts to entertain cases brought 
by aliens for “tort[s] . . . in violation of the law of nations.”  One might 
call the law applied in those cases “ATS federal common law”—that is, 
post-Erie federal common law derived from a congressional statute. 
Second, the content of a customary international law of torts, as 
federal common law, would seem to be determined by a two-pronged 
test consisting of an inquiry into the original understanding of 
“tort[s] . . . in violation of the law of the nations” at the time of the 
framing of the ATS, coupled with attention to jurisprudential 
                                                 
22 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal 
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 850 (1997). 
23 See Philip Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to International 
Law, 33 AM. J. INT’L L. 740, 743 (1939). 
24 The contribution most often identified with the view that post-Erie federal law is “new 
federal common law” is Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal Common 
Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964). 
25 William S. Dodge, Bridging Erie: Customary International Law in the U.S. Legal System 
After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 12 TULSA J. COMP & INT’L L. 87, 95-96 (2005) (arguing that a 
six-justice majority in Sosa rejected the argument that Congressional authorization was 
necessary for the federal courts to apply customary international law in any case, citing 
language in the Sosa majority opinion). 
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developments since the passage of the ATS, particularly the 
jurisprudential implications of Erie.  As will be presented in more detail, 
the Sosa Court concluded that the content of ATS federal common law 
was not entirely limited to those torts in violation of the law of nations 
recognized in the late eighteenth century because the law of nations was 
described by eighteenth-century jurists as having an evolving 
character. 26   Nonetheless, the Court added that modern versions of 
“tort[s] . . . in violation of the law of the nations” should only include 
actions widely condemned by the present international community.27 
Third, the Sosa decision apparently anticipated that a spate of 
potentially important issues remained open for investigation.  Some of 
those issues involved the constitutional implications of the federal courts 
deciding customary international law cases, which are outside the scope 
of this Article.28  Another set of issues relates more closely to the status of 
a customary international law of torts.  Outside the parameters of the 
ATS, to what extent may federal or state courts invoke customary 
international law in torts suits, and what sort of “law” would that be?  
The conceptualization of torts in violation of the law of nations by the 
Filartiga and Sosa decisions suggests that some torts can be derived from 
widespread contemporary international norms censuring conduct, such 
as torture, that were not widely stigmatized in the late eighteenth 
century.  If those definitions of torts in violation of the law of nations are 
applicable outside ATS cases, how much authority do federal and state 
courts have to draw upon customary international law in torts suits, and 
how should their decisions be treated? 
The last question raises the thorniest issue left unresolved by 
Filartiga and Sosa.  Once it becomes clear that both of those decisions 
were treating ATS customary international tort cases as post-Erie federal 
common law cases, it was evidence the cases leave open the status of 
other customary international law tort cases.  For example, nothing 
prevents state courts from using international norms as a source of 
“general” common law in their jurisdictions.  In addition, Erie, on its 
                                                 
26 Sosa v. Alavarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2761 (2004). 
27 Id. 
28 For example, if customary international law was not considered part of the “laws of 
the United States,” the federal courts would have no jurisdiction over cases such as Sosa, in 
which both parties were aliens.  Dodge, supra note 25, at 101-08 (arguing that the law of 
nations was initially considered among the “laws of the United States” for the purposes of 
both Article III and the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the United States Constitution, 
but both questions remain open). 
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face, binds federal courts to follow state common law decisions unless 
they involve issues governed by federal law.29 
Here, the implications of Sosa appear to clash with the implications 
of Erie, creating a potential conundrum.  Customary international law 
was, at the framing of the ATS and for many years thereafter, regarded 
as “general” law; that is, one of the sources for the common law rules 
handed down in federal and state courts, along with sources such as 
maritime law, the law merchant, and, at one point in the history of 
American jurisprudence, natural law.  But it has been assumed that in 
the post-Erie jurisprudential universe there is no general federal common 
law, only the specific federal common law ancillary to the Constitution 
or to federal statutes such as the ATS.  There remains, however, general 
state common law, including, hypothetically, a customary international 
law of torts derived from particular states.  Nothing would seem to 
prevent a state court from going further, when defining the scope of a 
customary international law of torts within its jurisdiction, than the Sosa 
Court went in defining “tort[s] . . . in violation of the law of nations” 
under the ATS.  Thus, if Erie governs customary international law 
decisions, a federal court might find itself bound to recognize a broader 
category of state customary international tort actions than the Sosa 
decision recognized under the ATS. 
When one considers the source of most customary international law 
cases, this situation seems odd.  One starts with widespread agreement 
that customary international law was treated in the framing generation 
as general common law.  Over the years, the particular interests of the 
federal government in international relations and international norms, as 
opposed to those of the states, have broadened and deepened.  By the 
1930s and 1940s, the Court, in a trio of cases sandwiching the Erie 
decision, declared that the foreign affairs powers of the federal 
government were plenary and exclusive and that federal executive 
agreements with foreign nations trumped competing state law. 30  
Meanwhile, the courts after Erie have identified areas in which federal 
courts are deemed to have continuing power to develop common law 
rules because the areas reflect unique and distinctive federal concerns.31  
Yet three members of the Sosa Court found that Erie precluded any use of 
                                                 
29 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 22, at 870. 
30 United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 
(1937); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
31 The association of “federal common law” with instances in which the federal 
government had  “unique” and “distinctive interests” first appeared in Boyle v. United 
Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504, 508 (1988). 
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current international norms, as opposed to those relied upon by the 
framers of the ATS in glossing of the statute by the federal courts.32  The 
majority, for its part, conceded that such glosses should be rare.33  At the 
same time, however, it is beyond cavil that a state court could invalidate 
the death penalty in its state on the ground that many nations have 
outlawed capital punishment. 
Part I of this Article, using the Court’s methodology in Sosa as a 
guide, will attempt to recover the content of a “customary international 
law” of torts at the time of the framing of the Constitution and to 
ascertain the meaning of the phrase, “a tort only, committed in violation 
of the law of nations” in the ATS.  Part II, again following the Court’s 
concerns in Sosa, will assess the effect of Erie on the original status of 
customary international law.  Part III will consider what the status of 
customary international law in American courts might be if Erie were 
determined to have no binding effect on the reception of that law by 
either federal or state courts.  This Article will conclude by addressing 
the potential implications of such a determination for the status of a 
customary international law of torts. 
II.  THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
LAW OF TORTS 
Both the Filartiga and Sosa decisions assumed that a first step in 
analyzing the meaning of the ATS was to determine what its framers 
understood to constitute a “tort . . . in violation of the law of nations.”  
But the decisions seem, at first blush, to have adopted contrasting views 
as to how much weight should be given to that original understanding.  
Whereas Filartiga maintained that “it is clear that courts must interpret 
international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists 
among the nations of the world today[,]”34  Sosa concluded that “courts 
should require any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest 
on a norm of international character . . . defined with a specificity 
comparable to . . . the 18th-century paradigms” for violations of the law 
of nations.35  Both interpretations invoked lines of historical evidence for 
their conclusions.  
                                                 
32 Sosa v. Alavarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2772-73 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part). 
33 Id. at 2764-67 (majority opinion). 
34 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d. 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980). 
35 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2761-62. 
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A. “Torts in Violation of the Law of Nations”:  Alternative Lines of Historical 
Evidence  
1. The Blackstone Line:  The ATS’s Eighteenth-Century Paradigms 
The Sosa decision presented a line of evidence from the founding 
generation suggesting that the language, “a tort . . . in violation of the 
law of nations” in the ATS referred to a specific set of civil wrongs that 
were seen as raising issues peculiar to the world of diplomacy and 
international relations.  The dominant source for the “18th-century 
paradigms” included in that set was William Blackstone’s Commentaries 
on the Laws of England.  Since the Sosa Court relied so heavily on 
Blackstone, but provided an attenuated analysis of his treatise, it seems 
worthwhile to examine the Commentaries in somewhat greater detail.  
No list of “torts in violation of the law of nations” appears in 
Blackstone’s Commentaries.  But it is nonetheless possible to extrapolate 
from the organization and structure of Blackstone’s treatise the 
“paradigm” torts he had in mind.  To find the paradigms, one matches 
up Blackstone’s discussion of “offenses against the law of nations” (by 
which he meant criminal offenses) with his treatment of torts.  This 
analysis reveals a category of civil offenses that are both cognizable as 
“torts” in Blackstone’s typology and bear a close connection to the 
“offenses against the law of nations” he describes.  That comparatively 
limited category of civil offenses, one can conclude, is what Blackstone 
meant by “torts in violation of the law of nations.” 
Next, one needs to make the assumption that Blackstone’s 
understanding was generally shared by the framers of the ATS.  Given 
the ubiquity of Blackstone as an authoritative source of law in late 
eighteenth-century America, this assumption is a comparatively easy one 
to make, and, as will be subsequently noted, there is additional evidence 
that the Congress that passed the ATS had an understanding of “offenses 
against the law of nations” comparable to that of Blackstone. 
In volume four of the first (1769) edition of his Commentaries, 
Blackstone devoted a chapter to “Offences Against the Law of Nations,” 
which he defined as “a system of rules, deducible by natural reason, and 
established by universal consent among the civilized inhabitants of the 
world.”36  In England, Blackstone noted, the law of nations was “adopted 
in its full extent by the common law, and is held to be a part of the law of 
                                                 
36 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *66. 
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the land.”37  He indicated that in “mercantile questions” and “all marine 
causes,” the “law-merchant,” which was “a branch of the law of 
nations,” was “regularly and constantly adhered to,” and the law of 
nations was also understood as governing “all disputes relating to 
prizes, to shipwrecks, to hostages and ransom bills.” 38   The law of 
nations, he concluded, was a “great universal law, collected from history 
and usage, and such writers of all nations and languages as are generally 
approved and allowed of.”39 
After these general remarks, Blackstone took up the more “narrow 
compass” of “offences against the law of nations.”40  Since his chapter 
was contained in a volume devoted to “public wrongs” which devoted 
itself to criminal law, criminal procedure, and punishment,41 it was clear 
that he meant the “offences” he discussed to be understood as crimes. 
a. “Offenses Against the Law of Nations” 
Blackstone began his treatment of “offences against the law of 
nations” by noting that they could “rarely be the object of the criminal 
law of any particular state.”  This was because most violations of the law 
of nations were committed by “whole states or nations,” in which case 
“recourse can only be had to war.”42  It was rare that “the individuals of 
any state” violated the law of nations, but when they did, it was “the 
interest as well as duty of the government” under which they lived “to 
animadvert upon them with becoming severity, that the peace of the 
world be maintained.”43  It was incumbent, Blackstone suggested, on 
nations “injured” by the acts of individuals to “demand satisfaction and 
justice to be done on the offender by the state to which he belongs.”  
Otherwise that state became “an accomplice or abettor of his subject’s 
crime.”44 
Blackstone then proceeded to list “the principal offences against the 
law of nations” that had been “animadverted on . . . by the municipal 
laws of England.”  They were “[v]iolation of safe-conducts,” 
“[i]nfringement of the rights of ambassadors,” and “[p]iracy.”45  His 
                                                 
37 Id. at *67. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at *67-68. 
41 Id. at *1. 
42 Id. at *68. 
43 Id.  Blackstone used “animadvert upon” as a synonym for “censure.” 
44 Id. 
45 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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subsequent discussion of those offenses emphasized their close 
connection with the preservation of amicable intercourse among 
sovereign nations.46 
“Safe-conducts,” or “passports,” by which foreign subjects were 
protected from being interfered with by the local population, were an 
essential ingredient of the maintenance of “intercourse or commerce 
between one nation and another.”47  Blackstone noted that “one of the 
articles of [M]agna [C]arta” had been “that foreign merchants shall be 
entitled to safe-conduct and security throughout the kingdom” and that 
a series of statutes had made the breaking of truces or safe conducts high 
treason against the King. 48   Additional statutes allowed the Lord 
Chancellor to bring an action on behalf of a foreign subject whose safe 
conduct had been interfered with for restitution of goods or personal 
effects that had been seized in the process.49  The offense reflected the 
fact that even though European nations had engaged in war with one 
another for centuries, no one nation could survive economically without 
regular commercial contacts with its neighbors, thus, some form of 
immunity for commercial travelers and foreigners engaged in diplomatic 
relations with their host nations was imperative.  Blackstone’s discussion 
also stressed that when the safe conduct of a foreign citizen was 
threatened, the “honor” of the King was “particularly engaged,” because 
it might give rise to a diplomatic incident or disrupt commerce.50 
Closely connected to the safe conduct of foreign citizens was the 
protection for “ambassadors” and members of their households. 51  
Ambassadors were a class of persons formally afforded safe conducts 
and other protection because they were professionally engaged in the 
maintenance of civil relations between their respective nations and 
England.  They were so vital to that process, in fact, that they were given 
immunity against civil or criminal redress for wrongs they might have 
committed against members of the local population.52  As Blackstone 
noted, “the common law of England recognizes them in their full extent 
by immediately stopping all legal process, sued out through the 
ignorance or rashness of individuals, which may entrench upon the 
                                                 
46 Id. at *68-73. 
47 Id. at *68. 
48 Id. at *69 (emphasis omitted). 
49 Id. at *69-70. 
50 Id. at *69. 
51 Id. at *70. 
52 Id. 
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immunities of a foreign minister or any of his train.”53  Not only was “all 
process whereby the person of any embassador, or of his domestic or 
domestic servant, may be arrested, or his goods distreined or 
seized, . . . utterly null and void,” but “all persons” who had executed 
that process, once “being convicted, by confession or the oath of one 
witness,” were “deemed violators of the laws of nations and disturbers 
of the public repose.”  They were amenable to “such penalties and 
corporal punishment” as judges saw fit to impose.54 
The solicitude afforded ambassadors and their staff illustrates the 
widespread perception among eighteenth-century European nations that 
the regular presence of foreign diplomats within their borders was vital 
to successful international relations.  As contacts with foreign powers, 
diplomats were important links in the chain of communication that 
fostered harmonious relations with those powers; and, as official 
representatives of a foreign nation stationed in a host country, diplomats 
personified the dignity of that nation.  Injuries or embarrassments to 
them thus had the potential to be regarded as affronts to that dignity, 
and the “ignorance or rashness” of citizens of the host nation toward 
diplomats had the potential to reflect upon the reputation of the host.  
The potential for lawsuits against ambassadors or members of their 
households to become international incidents was felt so keenly, that 
those who brought such lawsuits were deemed to have committed 
offenses against the law of nations.55  
                                                 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at *70-71. 
55 Id.  The perception that lawsuits involving diplomatic personnel would invariably be 
taken as affronts to the dignity of the nation with which the diplomats were connected goes 
far to explain the very wide scope given to diplomatic immunity in Anglo-American 
common law.  At first blush, it would not seem to reflect adversely on a diplomat’s home 
nation if the diplomat was charged with riding a horse carelessly so as to injure someone, 
or with breaking into the home of a resident.  But the reasoning behind wide-ranging 
diplomatic immunity seems to have been that when such incidents occurred, the honor of 
the diplomat’s home nation would inevitably be drawn into question, and the situation, 
from that nation’s perspective, would be worsened by the fact that the incident had 
occurred on foreign soil, outside the range of the nation’s authority.  Thus, even accusing 
diplomats of committing torts or crimes was likely to cause international tension.  
Diplomats and their staffs were thus given immunities in order to prevent the occurrence 
of potentially embarrassing incidents involving them, and, to make doubly sure, 
punishments were accorded against those who rashly or ignorantly sought legal redress 
against diplomats.  Wide-ranging diplomatic immunities in English law also had the effect 
of encouraging other nations to confer reciprocal privileges on English diplomats serving 
in those nations. 
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The last of Blackstone’s offenses against the law of nations was 
piracy.56  To grasp the enormity of the offense of piracy for Blackstone 
and his contemporaries, one must recall the fact that a very large portion 
of international commerce in the eighteenth century took place on ships 
in the high seas, and that many of the wars involved confrontations 
between navies on the ocean.  Just as it had been vital for European 
nations to distinguish between war and commercial intercourse on land, 
it was equally important to maintain that distinction on sea.  The 
international rules and customs of intercourse on the sea also reflected 
the fact that, as compared with land, the ocean was boundless and far 
more difficult to police.  Consequently, the law maritime from the 
earliest origins of sea-faring commercial and naval ventures laid down 
universal rules affecting the conduct of sea-going vessels and their 
interaction with one another.  Naval ships of belligerents, neutrals, 
privateers, and commercial vessels were expected to behave in 
conformity with those rules when their paths crossed on the high seas. 
In this context, pirates were the equivalent of twenty-first century 
terrorists, who also function in a world that combines frequent 
international commercial exchange with regular wars and international 
understandings about the conduct of nations at war.  The notoriety of 
pirates came not merely from the fact that they robbed or plundered or 
assaulted other ships and their personnel, but that they did not observe 
the rules of the law maritime or the rules of war.  Some of those rules, 
such as the different obligations of belligerent ships toward other 
belligerent, neutral, or commercial vessels, were designed to preserve 
commercial exchange in the shifting context of international alliances 
and wars.  Others, such as the requirement that ships of a nation 
eventually display their national flags before engaging in combat with an 
enemy, were designed to aid in the policing of the high seas and 
minimizing diplomatic tension.  When pirates refused to follow those 
rules, most prominently by attacking other ships regardless of their 
status and by concealing their identity through the use of false flags or 
signals, they undermined the delicate balance between naval traffic as an 
instrument of war and naval traffic as a means of international 
commercial exchange.  Blackstone had no hesitation in labeling a pirate 
as one who “has renounced all the benefits of society and government, 
                                                 
56 See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *68.  For a discussion of the great significance 
afforded to piracy by Americans in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, see 
G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 870-79 (Oxford Univ. 
Press 1991) (1988). 
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and has reduced himself afresh to the savage state of nature.” 57  “[B]y 
declaring war against all mankind,” pirates should expect that “all 
mankind must declare war against [them].”58 
Blackstone’s discussion of piracy stressed the capacity of pirates to 
disturb the delicacies of high seas commercial intercourse.  After 
defining piracy “by common law” as “those acts of robbery and 
depredation upon the high seas which, if committed upon land, would 
have amounted to felony there[,]” he noted that statutes had made 
“some other offenses piracy also.” 59   It was piracy for a subject to 
“commit[ ] any act of hostility upon the high seas against others of his 
majesty’s subjects under color of a commission from any foreign 
power.”60  It was piracy for “any commander, or other seafaring person,” 
to run away with a ship, or ammunition, or goods, or to yield them up 
voluntarily to a pirate, or to conspire to do any of those acts.61  It was 
piracy for anyone to confine the commander of ship to prevent his 
defending the ship.62  It was piracy to trade with pirates or to furnish 
them with stores or ammunition.  Finally, it was piracy to forcibly board 
a merchant vessel.63  
Any version of piracy was punishable by death.64  The supplemental 
list of “piracy” offenses signaled the obvious threats piracy posed to a 
high seas culture whose good order and harmony was predicated on the 
maintenance of a bright line between belligerency and commercial 
trafficking.  Merchant vessels and neutrals were to be left alone on the 
high seas even when the ships of belligerents were attacking one 
another; to do otherwise was to invite chaos.  Pirates were the symbol of 
that chaos.  Thus, by not following the rules of the high seas strictly, one 
took the risk of being judged a pirate. 
Blackstone assumed that violations of safe conduct, offenses against 
ambassadors, and piracy exhausted the category of offenses against the 
law of nations.  As noted, his discussion of the offenses had taken place 
                                                 
57 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *71. 
58 Id. 
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in the volume of his Commentaries devoted to criminal law. 65   His 
discussion, taken by itself, would not seem to provide guidance about 
the potential meaning of “a tort . . . in violation of the law of nations” in 
the ATS.  But when Blackstone’s treatment of offenses against the law of 
nations is matched up with his treatment of “private wrongs” or torts, 
the meaning of the phrase can be seen as clarified.  
b. Torts 
In volume three of his Commentaries, Blackstone introduced a chapter 
on “[w]rongs, and their [r]emedies, respecting the rights of persons.”66  
As the introduction to a 1979 facsimile edition of the Commentaries 
pointed out, that chapter, despite being included in a book titled Of 
Private Wrongs, was not devoted to the substantive law of torts, but 
mainly to English civil procedure.  A “few [other] thin chapters” in 
volume three, however, canvassed “the rudimentary tort law of the mid-
eighteenth century.”67  For our purposes, the salient chapter68 is one in 
which Blackstone defined “the several injuries cognizable by the courts 
of common law,” which he divided into “actions personal, real, and 
mixed,”69 and subdivided the personal actions into contracts and “torts 
or wrongs.”70 
The torts that emerged from this classification process were of two 
sorts: injuries which “affect[ed] the personal security of individuals,”71 
and injuries which violated their “personal liberty.” 72   In the first 
category, Blackstone placed assault, battery, “threats and menaces of 
bodily hurt,” “mayhem or wounding,” “[i]njuries, affecting a man’s 
health,” and “injuries affecting a man’s reputation.”73  His discussion of 
those torts was disjointed, alternating between descriptions of the 
                                                 
65 Blackstone’s discussion of offenses against the law of nations was included in a 
volume of his treatise labeled “public wrongs” and included mention of the criminal 
penalties for violations. Id. at *1. 
66 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *115-143. 
67 John H. Langbein, Introduction, in 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
LAWS OF ENGLAND: A FACSIMILE OF THE FIRST EDITION iii (1979). 
68 Two other chapters, “Of Trespass,” and “Of Nuisance,” seem less relevant because 
Blackstone’s definitions of those torts, which hypothetically enabled them to be matched 
up with offenses against the law of nations (as where someone invaded the property of an 
ambassador or erected a smelting house adjacent to that land), do not seem as obviously 
connected to the criminal offenses against the law of nations Blackstone identified. 
69 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *117. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at *119. 
72 Id. at *127. 
73 Id. at *120-23. 
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elements of the action and the appropriate form of writ for bringing it. 
Some of the torts he listed do not seem, on analysis, to have distinctive 
elements.  For example, “threats and menaces of bodily hurt” would 
seem to be simply a species of assault, and “mayhem” would seem to be a 
species of battery.  In addition, “injuries affecting a man’s health” was a 
category based on the nature of the injury and damages rather than on 
the elements of the action.74  
Blackstone’s last example of a tort affecting the personal security of 
individuals was “injuries affecting a man’s reputation,” or slanders, libels, 
and malicious prosecutions. 75   His discussion of slander and libel 
suggested that the common law of defamation had, by the eighteenth 
century, taken on many of its conventional features, such as the 
distinction between general and special damages; the development of a 
category of slanders (so-called slanders per se) where recovery could be 
had without proof of special damages; the requirement, in some cases, 
that a plaintiff show the “innuendo” or defamatory meaning, in the 
words; and the role of truth as a defense.76  His discussion of malicious 
prosecution noted that although plaintiffs needed to obtain copies of the 
indictments brought against them in order to show that they had been 
“made the engines of private spite and enmity” through a criminal 
prosecution, “in prosecutions for felony, it is usual to deny a copy of the 
indictment,” and such was justifiable when “any probable cause for 
preferring it” existed.77 
Blackstone listed only one tort associated with “the violation of the 
right of personal liberty”—false imprisonment.78  The incarcerations of 
persons in England who held dissident religious or political views was a 
sufficiently keen memory to Blackstone and his contemporaries that he 
took the opportunity to discuss the ways in which those falsely 
                                                 
74 Id.  Blackstone included in the category injuries from “the exercise of a noisome trade, 
which infects the air in [a] neighborhood,” as well as injuries from “the neglect or unskilful 
management of [a] physician” or the “selling [of] bad provisions or wine.”  Id.  He may 
have introduced this category because many of the wrongs included in it produced injuries 
“unaccompanied by force,” so that injured persons filed suit in trespass on the case rather 
than in trespass.  But if Blackstone meant his health injuries category to serve as a collection 
of wrongs based on negligent rather than intentional acts, his example of the exercise of a 
noisome trade did not serve that purpose. 
75 Id. at *123. 
76 Id at *124-26.  Blackstone occasionally misstated the law of defamation, as when he 
declared that “part of the definition of slander” was that words be “maliciously spoken.”  Id. 
at *125.  In fact, an inadvertent error, so long as it was sufficiently damaging to someone’s 
reputation, was actionable. 
77 Id. at *126-27. 
78 Id. at *127. 
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imprisoned could be removed from their predicament as well as their 
compensation.79  He listed four writs that imprisoned persons could use 
to obtain their freedom, emphasizing the writ of habeas corpus, “the 
most celebrated writ in the English law,” which he characterized as “the 
great and efficacious writ in all manner of illegal confinement,” and 
noted that “the glory of the English law consists in clearly defining the 
times, the causes, and the extent, when, wherefore, and to what degree, 
the imprisonment of the subject may be lawful.”80  After a lengthy paean 
to the great writ, Blackstone noted that when a person could show that 
he had been “detained,” and unlawfully so, he was then entitled to bring 
an action of trespass for false imprisonment and to “recover damages for 
the injury he has received.”81  
Blackstone prefaced his discussion of civil injuries by noting that 
those involving “force and violence,” such as batteries or false 
imprisonment, “savour something of the criminal kind,” and invariably 
subjected their perpetrators to a public fine for disturbing the peace, as 
well as damages to those injured. 82   Thus, crimes and torts were 
sometimes indissolubly linked, even though they might spawn different 
remedies.  This suggested that many criminal offenses were also 
actionable as torts, and that the offenses which had been identified as 
violating the law of nations might, depending on the circumstances in 
which they were perpetrated, give rise to tort actions as well.  
c. “Torts in Violation of the Law of Nations” 
One could imagine, for example, that in many situations when the 
safe conduct of foreigners or merchants was interfered with, assaults, 
batteries, and even false imprisonments might take place. “Ignorant” or 
“rash” individuals might also commit those torts on ambassadors or 
members of their staffs. And the acts of pirates would constitute an 
unending series of assaults, batteries, and false imprisonments. The 
negligent treatment of ambassadors or their staffs by physicians, or even 
the negligent sale to embassy personnel of spoiled food or beverages, 
might threaten to provoke international incidents. Finally, the 
reputations of persons given safe conduct, or ambassadors or their staffs, 
are subject to being falsely impugned, and slander or libel against a 
representative of a foreign nation—given that an incident leading to a 
defamation charge necessarily affects both the reputation of the person 
                                                 
79 Id. at *127-38. 
80 Id. at *129-33. 
81 Id. at *137-38. 
82 Id. at *118-19. 
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being defamed and, implicitly, that of the defamer—could easily have 
international implications. 
In short, an analysis of Blackstone’s Commentaries suggests that given 
the widespread use of Blackstone as a source of legal authority in late 
eighteenth-century America,83 the framers of the ATS might have had a 
relatively concrete understanding of “a tort . . . in violation of the law of 
nations.”  That conclusion is reinforced by the fact that shortly after the 
Constitution provided that Congress could “define and 
punish . . . Offenses against the Law of nations,” 84 the First Congress 
passed The Crimes Act of 1790, a statute punishing violations of safe 
conduct, assaults on ambassadors, and piracy. 85 
In a recent article, Thomas H. Lee reinforced this line of argument by 
demonstrating that The Crimes Act and the Judiciary Act of 1789, taken 
together, addressed piracy and assaults on ambassadors in some detail.86  
The Judiciary Act gave the federal courts jurisdiction over civil suits 
arising out of incidents involving piracy or disputes over captured prize 
ships, and also gave the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over civil 
cases brought by foreign ministers, ambassadors, or consuls. 87   The 
Crimes Act contained several provisions detailing penalties for piracy 
and violations of the persons and property of ministers or members of 
their household. 88   Lee maintains that this legislation, when placed 
alongside the ATS, reveals an “impressive, intricate scheme” designed 
by the framers to redress those crimes and torts that were understood at 
the time as violating international law norms.89 
Lee then suggests that the statutory scheme he reconstructs clarifies 
the purpose of the ATS.  Since piracy and assaults on ambassadors were 
addressed in some detail in other statutes, he argues that the “tort” 
focused upon in the ATS was likely that of violations of safe conduct.90  
This hypothesis, Lee believes, is reinforced by the fact that violations of 
                                                 
83 See Dennis Nolan, Sir William Blackstone and the New American Republic: A Study of 
Intellectual Impact, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 731 (1976). 
84 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
85 An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, ch. 9, §§ 8-12, 
28, 1 Stat. 112, 113-14, 117-18 (1790). 
86 Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
830 (2006). 
87 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80; id. § 9, at 77; id. § 12, at 79 (quoted 
in Lee, supra note 86, at 866-67). 
88 See Crimes Act of 1790 (quoted in Lee, supra note 86, at 867-68). 
89 Lee, supra note 86, at 866. 
90 Id. passim. 
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the safe conduct of foreign citizens within the United States would 
commonly occur in the form of routine transgressions scattered over the 
country, making them difficult to redress by national authorities. 91  
Although Congress could have criminalized such offenses, this would 
have had the effect of promulgating federal common law crimes, a 
highly sensitive issue in the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-
centuries.  Finally, Lee suggests that the “safe conduct” theory of the 
ATS helps explain its use of the word “only” after “tort.”92  The word 
was used to prevent aliens (typically British citizens) from using the state 
courts, with their lower jurisdictional amounts, to recover property or 
debts that had been guarantied to them by the 1783 Treaty of Paris, 
which addressed the nullification of alien property and contract claims 
by post-Revolutionary War legislation in American states.93  Aliens could 
bring “tort[s] only in violation of the law of nations” in state courts 
under the ATS; their contract or property claims could only be brought 
in the federal courts, which had a damage threshold of $500.94 
But all this evidence does not exhaust an inquiry into the meaning of 
the statute.  For rather than particularizing the offenses that triggered it, 
the statute’s framers used the generic terms “tort only in violation of the 
law of nations” to describe the statute’s applicability.95  Before one can 
                                                 
91 Id. at 896-99. 
92 Id. at 899. 
93 Id. at 896-99. 
94 Id. at 897-98.  Lee puts a hypothetical to illustrate the concerns he believes animated 
the “tort only” language of the ATS.  Id.  Assume that after the ATS’s passage, a British 
creditor attempted to collect a legitimate $500 debt owed him by a citizen of Virginia, and 
was met not only by the defense of a Virginia statute nullifying the debt but by the 
intervention of a Virginia sheriff, who assaulted him and temporarily incarcerated him.  Id. 
at 898.  Under the Treaty of Paris the creditor should have been entitled to a recovery of the 
debt, and the sheriff’s action was a prototypical violation of his safe conduct, giving rise to 
tort actions for assault, battery, and false imprisonment.  Id.  However, the ATS’s language 
did not permit the creditor to sue for the debt in federal court, and the amount of the debt 
did not meet the federal courts’ jurisdictional threshold of sums exceeding $500.  Id. at 899.  
Thus the ATS, Lee suggests, was designed to preserve the principle that the United States 
would continue to afford safe conduct to foreigners within its borders, but at the same time 
not allow aliens access to the federal courts for satisfaction of other than very substantial 
property or contract claims—those exceeding $500.  Id.  The hypothesis also suggests that 
the ATS was intended to encompass torts “in violation of the law of nations” committed by 
aliens against other aliens within the borders of the United States.  Id. at 899-900.  The safe 
conduct principle protected aliens in America regardless of who violated their safe 
conduct: it amounted to a promise of protection by the United States itself.  Id. 
95 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 
(2000)). Commentators writing before Lee have also sought to explain the ATS’s inclusion 
of the word “only” between “tort” and “violation of the law of nations.”  Two articles in 
the 1980s advanced one of Lee’s arguments, that the word was used to ensure that foreign 
(mainly British) creditors seeking to recover debts incurred to them by American citizens 
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settle on the proposition that the ATS referred only to those torts in 
existence at the time of its passage, and only to those which could be 
connected to the cognizable “offenses against the law of nations” at that 
time, one would have to conclude that the framers of the ATS 
understood that “offenses against the law of nations” would invariably 
be limited to those identified in Blackstone’s Commentaries.96 
The difficulty with that conclusion is twofold. Not only has no 
evidence surfaced suggesting that the framers of the ATS believed that it 
                                                                                                             
would need to meet the jurisdictional requirements for suits in the federal courts, which 
included a requirement that the sum in question exceed $500.  Since the ATS gave the 
federal and state courts jurisdiction over all causes where an alien sues for a tort, the 
articles suggested that there was a concern that it might be used to evade the jurisdictional 
amount requirement in cases combining contract and tort claims.  See Casto, supra note 1, at 
507-08; Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction over International Law Claims, 18 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 1, 28-31 (1985).  But see Joseph Modeste Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of 
the Law of Nations, 18 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 445, 446 (1995) (disputing this view).  
Sweeney stated that “I never could see why granting jurisdiction over a ‘tort’ should be 
read as implying a grant of jurisdiction over something other than a tort, thus creating a 
need to exclude the possibility.”  Id.  Sweeney argued that the ATS was designed to apply 
only to prize cases in which “the legality of a capture was not in issue, and the suit was 
‘only’ for the reparation in damages of a wrong related to a capture.”  Id. at 482.  Sweeney’s 
criticism of the interpretation of “only” advanced by Randall and Casto seems appropriate.  
But his interpretation fails to explain why the ATS’s original language referred to “all” 
actions, why the ATS would have been necessary when the federal courts already had 
jurisdiction over prize cases under the Constitution, and why no early cases interpreting 
the ATS assumed that it referred only to a limited category of prize cases.  See William S. 
Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute, 19 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
221, 244-53 (1996) (internal quotations omitted).  I am inclined to agree with Dodge’s and 
Lee’s explanation of the word “only” in the ATS:  that it was designed to limit actions 
under the statute to tort remedies, thereby preventing suitors under the statute from 
waiving those remedies and seeking assumpsit or restitution.  Id. at 254-55 (citing language 
in Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942, 948 (D. Pa. 1793) and Bullard v. Bell, 4 F. Cas. 624, 
639 (C.C.D.N.H. 1817)).  The Sosa Court made a version of this argument, stating that the 
word “only” “may have served the . . . purpose of putting foreigners on notice that they 
would no longer be able to prosecute their own criminal cases in federal court[,]” and citing 
a 1794 opinion of the U.S. Attorney General to that effect.  See Sosa v. Alavarez-Machain, 
124 S. Ct. 2739, 2758 n.12 (2004). 
96 This was the argument made by Judge Robert Bork in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 
726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  Lee does not agree with that argument.  In attempting to 
show that the ATS was principally directed to violations of the safe conduct of aliens, he is 
not insisting, given the breadth of the ATS’s “tort only” language, that it must be read as 
exclusively directed to those violations.  His purpose is rather to suggest that since 
protections against violations of the safe conduct of foreigners amounted to a unilateral 
promise by a sovereign nation rather than a consensual understanding that some conduct 
violated the standards of all civilized nations, ATS violations should be understood as 
requiring a “U.S. nexus,” that is, some connection between the tortfeasor and the United 
States.  See Lee, supra note 86, at 901-04 (arguing that the ATS should apply when the 
tortfeasor had a “presence” in the United States, even if the tort occurred outside its 
boundaries). 
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would always be limited to “torts in violation of the law of nations” that 
could be identified by a reading of Blackstone, there is abundant 
evidence that they believed that “the law of nations” would evolve over 
time, and that, consequently, “offenses against the law of nations” and 
“torts in violation of the law of nations” might evolve as well.  
2. The Evolving Law of Nations Line 
We have seen that Blackstone had defined the “law of nations” as “a 
system of rules, deducible by natural reason,” which “must necessarily 
result from those principles of natural justice, in which all the learned of 
every nation agree.”97  Since that passage presupposes that “the learned 
of every nation” were capable of deducing the “system of rules” that the 
law of nations represented, it follows that the law of nations might well 
not be a static entity. Given this conclusion, it is important to understand 
what Blackstone and his contemporaries meant by “natural reason” and 
“natural justice” in the passage, because “natural reason” and “natural 
justice” were among the sources from which the law of nations was to be 
derived. 
Modern readers of Blackstone’s definition of the law of nations 
might be inclined to conclude that its content would change along with 
understandings of “natural reason” and “natural justice” in the 
international community.  The law of nations would thus resemble Chief 
Justice Earl Warren’s standard for determining the meaning of “cruel 
and unusual punishment” in the Eighth Amendment:  “the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”98  
In one sense, this conclusion would be accurate.  As Justice Joseph 
Story stated in an 1822 circuit court opinion, “every doctrine that may be 
fairly deduced by correct reasoning from . . . the nature of moral 
obligation may theoretically be said to exist in the law of nations.”99  But 
“[i]t does not follow,” Justice Story maintained, “that because a principle 
cannot be found settled by the consent or practice of nations at one time, 
it is to be concluded, that at no subsequent period the principle can be 
considered as incorporated into the public code of nations.”100 
Justice Story’s statement captured the founding era generation’s 
dominant understanding of the law of nations.  That law was partly 
                                                 
97 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *66-67. 
98 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
99 United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 846 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822). 
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reflected in international customs and treaties, which could be expected 
to change over time.  But at the same time, it was founded on the 
principles of “natural justice,” “natural reason,” and “the nature of moral 
obligation.”  Those principles, being immanent and immutable, were 
always available as sources for the law of nations, whether or not a given 
principle had been codified in a custom or treaty. 
Thus, it is important to place late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-
century comments about the evolving quality of the law of nations in 
context.  For example, in a 1796 Supreme Court opinion, Justice James 
Wilson stated that the United States was “bound to receive the law of 
nations” as part of the corpus of its common law, and that the law of 
nations was in a “modern state of purity and refinement.”101  Earlier, 
Thomas Jefferson had written to Thomas Pickney that the “principles” of 
the law of nations “have been liberalized in latter times by the 
refinement of manners & morals.”102  These statements, taken together 
with that of Justice Story, demonstrate that commentators expected the 
law of nations to evolve and to become more enlightened in the process.  
But the critical phrase in Story’s dictum was, “may theoretically be 
said to exist in the law of nations.”  By that phrase he meant that once 
“learned” members of the civilized world concluded that a certain 
practice was consistent with “natural reason” or “natural justice,” that 
practice was revealed as already part of the law of nations.  A similar 
jurisprudential assumption can be found in Blackstone, who said, in 
discussing statutes implementing international law rules, “those acts of 
parliament, which have from time to time been made to enforce this 
universal law . . . are not to be considered as introductive of any new 
rule, but merely as declaratory of the old fundamental constitutions of 
the kingdom.”103 
The idea that newly derived principles of the law of nations were 
actually declarations of pre-existing conceptions of natural reason and 
natural justice might not seem to have any effect on the question of 
whether the content of international law evolved over time.  There is no 
evidence that Blackstone, Jefferson, Wilson, or Story found any 
inconsistency between an evolving definition of the content of the law of 
nations and a static, declaratory theory of the sources of common law.  
But they did not find the two conceptions inconsistent because they 
                                                 
101 Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199, 281 (1796). 
102 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Pickney (May 7, 1793), in 7 THE WORKS OF 
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assumed that customary international law, like other elements of the 
common law, was part of a body of preexisting legal principles, many of 
which remained to be discovered, declared, and applied by judges.  In 
such a universe, judges were regarded as learned savants rather than 
creative policymakers, and declaration of legal principles was treated as 
different from lawmaking.  The fact that the content of customary 
international law changed over time as new principles were discovered 
and applied by judges was not thought to raise issues about the proper 
scope of the judicial function.  In all areas of the common law, judges 
were given license to draw on a variety of sources, including “natural 
reason” and “natural justice,” in deriving the law’s corpus.104 
So long as the principles that judges discovered and applied to cases 
were believed to be already in existence, the process of judicial discovery 
and application was not treated as willful or creative and issues of 
judicial lawmaking remained dormant.  But in the early twentieth 
century, the declaratory theory of judicial decision-making came under 
attack as a fiction.  It was premised, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
stated in a 1928 case, on a conception of the common law as “a 
transcendental body of law outside of any particular state but obligatory 
within it.”  There was, Holmes concluded, “no such body of law.”105  By 
the 1930s, Holmes’s conclusion that the common law could no longer be 
regarded as independent of decisions rendered by judges had become 
orthodoxy.  In Sosa, the Court took for granted that “the prevailing 
conception of the common law has changed since 1789,” and that there is 
now “a general understanding that the law is not so much found or 
discovered as it is either made or created.” 106  “[A] judge deciding in 
                                                 
104 For more detail on this understanding of judicial decision-making in common law 
cases by eighteenth and early nineteenth century American commentators, see WHITE, THE 
MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, supra note 56, at 134-35, discussing the 
following passage from St. George Tucker’s 1803 edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries: 
In short, as the matters cognizable in the federal courts 
belong . . . partly to the civil law; partly to the maritime law; . . . partly 
to the general laws and action of merchants; and partly to the 
municipal laws of any foreign nation, or of any state in the 
union . . . so, the law of nations, the common law of England, the civil 
law, the law maritime, the . . . law of the foreign nation, or state in 
which the cause of action may arise . . . must in their turn be resorted 
to as the rule of decision, according to the nature and circumstances of 
each case, respectively. So that each of these laws may be regarded, so 
far as they apply to such cases, . . . as the law of the land. 
St. George Tucker, Appendix E, in 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at*429-30. 
105 Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928). 
106 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2762 (2004). 
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reliance on an international norm,” the Court added, “will find a 
substantial element of discretionary judgment in the decision.”107 
Further, after the Erie decision’s use of Holmes’s critique of the 
declaratory conception of common law to conclude that there was no 
“general” federal common law as such,108 the modern orthodoxy is that 
the “common law” is the law of the states plus “havens of [federal] 
specialty” created by Congress or by the Court “in interstitial areas of 
particular federal interest.”109  The Filartiga decision’s conception of the 
potential reach of the ATS seemed at odds, the Sosa Court would 
suggest, with a chastened, post-Erie understanding of the status of 
customary international law as “general” common law. 
B. Sosa’s Compromise 
1. Sosa’s “Door Ajar” 
Nonetheless, the Sosa majority did not endorse Justice Antonin 
Scalia’s conclusion that modern theories of the sources of law, when 
coupled with the Erie decision, precluded federal courts “from 
recognizing any further international norms as judicially enforceable 
today, absent further congressional action.”110  Justice David Souter, for 
the majority, stated that although “we now tend to understand common 
law not as a discoverable reflection of universal reason but . . . as a 
product of human choice,” and that after Erie “federal courts have no 
authority to derive ‘general’ common law,”111 the Court was inclined to 
keep “the door . . . ajar” for recognition that the ATS applied to “a 
narrow class of international norms today.”112  “We think it would be 
unreasonable to assume,” Justice Souter wrote, “that the First Congress 
would have expected federal courts to lose all capacity to recognize 
enforceable international norms simply because the common law might 
lose some metaphysical cachet on the way to modern realism.”113 Hence, 
the Sosa majority was willing to recognize claims under the ATS for 
violations of international law norms that had content as definite as, and 
an “acceptance among civilized nations” as widespread as, the norms 
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that prohibited violations of safe conducts, assaults on ambassadors, and 
piracy in the eighteenth century.114 
As a practical solution, the Sosa decision seemed sensible enough.  It 
gave meaningful content to the ATS as a jurisdiction-conferring 
provision, but at the same time limited the statute’s reach.  Although the 
Sosa Court suggested that the ATS might ultimately embrace some 
additional “tort[s] . . . in violation of the law of nations,” the only ones 
that seemed to contain the requisite specificity and universal 
condemnation—torts related to the torture of humans—had already been 
connected to a criminal offense by the Torture Victim Protection Act of 
1991.115  In short, Sosa stood for the proposition that if a great many 
nations of the world condemn a particular offense, torts connected to 
that offense are very likely within the scope of the ATS.  The door did 
not seem to have opened very wide.  
2. Sosa and the Original Understanding of the Alien Tort Statute 
The far more interesting dimension of Sosa was the interaction of its 
Originalist methodology with the jurisprudential implications of 
inquiring into the “original understanding” of the ATS after Erie.  
Whatever one concludes about the meaning of “a tort only in violation of 
the law of nations” within the ATS, it is clear that the framers of that 
statute anticipated that both state and federal courts would be treating 
“the law of nations” as part of the common law they declared and 
applied in their decisions.  A “tort only in violation of the law of nations” 
was understood as a subset of a body of general law, the law of nations, 
which, like other bodies of general law such as the law merchant, helped 
make up the common law itself.  Both state and federal courts declared 
this general law.  The ATS allowed aliens to sue in either set of courts for 
torts in violation of the law of nations. 
There was, therefore, what might be called a pre-Erie law of 
nations—part of the general law that both federal and state courts 
declared. 116   But after Erie, the status of that law of nations was 
apparently altered.  To the extent that the law of nations, as part of the 
general law applied in the federal courts, was “federal common law,” it 
was labeled illegitimate by Erie.  And to the extent that the general law of 
nations continued to be applied in state courts, it was “state common 
law” after Erie and it continued in existence, being factored into the 
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corpus of international law decisions in a particular state’s common law 
jurisprudence.  Those consequences of Erie seemed perverse to some 
commentators because most cases involving applications of the law of 
nations tended to be brought in federal court and the federal 
government’s interest in the adjudication of disputes involving the law 
of nations, many of which involved citizens of other nations as litigants, 
would seem to be stronger, as a general matter, than the interest of 
individual states.117  
Further, courts and commentators recognized that it was possible, 
after Erie, for federal courts to “create federal common law rules in 
interstitial areas of particular federal interest.”118   This “new federal 
common law” was sometimes mandated by a Congressional statute that 
expressly authorized the federal courts to interpret it, but such express 
authorizations were not treated as absolute requirements for judicial 
activity. With respect to the ATS, its language, which employs the 
general term “tort . . . in violation of the law of nations” and refers to 
“any civil action,” makes it hard for it to have any effect without judicial 
interpretation.  
3. Sosa as a “New Federal Common Law” Decision 
All of this suggests that the role of Originalist analysis in Sosa needs 
to be understood in a different way.  After completing his historical 
analysis of the original understanding of the ATS (“we have found no 
basis to suspect Congress had any examples in mind beyond those torts 
corresponding to Blackstone’s three primary offenses”),119 Justice Souter 
pointed out, citing Filartiga, that “no development in the two centuries 
from the enactment of [the ATS] to the birth of the modern line of [ATS] 
cases . . . has categorically precluded federal courts from recognizing a 
claim under the law of nations as an element of common law. . . .”120  By 
“common law,” in that sentence, he could only mean post-Erie, 
interstitial, federal common law.  Justice Souter then argued that “there 
are good reasons for a restrained conception of the discretion a federal 
court should exercise in considering a new cause of action of this kind,” 
that is, one “based on the present-day law of nations.”121 
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That last sentence, with its references to a “new” cause of action and 
“the present-day” law of nations, seems to suggest that the Sosa decision 
should be understood as an exercise in developing a “new” federal 
common law of the ATS.  As the statute provided the implicit 
authorization for the judicial articulation of common law under it, its 
original meaning, with its comparatively limited conception of torts in 
violation of the law of nations, remained relevant.  But the remaining 
reasons “for judicial caution when considering the kinds of individual 
claims that might implement the jurisdiction conferred by the early 
statute”122 were post-Erie reasons.  Justice Souter noted the collapse of 
the older, “transcendental” conception of the common law in the early 
twentieth century and the emergence of “new,” interstitial federal 
common law in the wake of Erie.123  He emphasized the fact that the 
“common law” being expounded in Sosa was closely related to a statute, 
and thus courts should be slow to create private rights of action absent 
express legislative guidance.124  He stressed the interest in the federal 
executive and legislative branches in discouraging “federal courts [from] 
craft[ing] remedies for the violation of new norms of international law” 
which might have “adverse foreign policy consequences.” 125  
Additionally, he maintained that the federal courts “have no 
congressional mandate to seek out and define new and debatable 
violations of the law of nations,” and “the Senate has expressly declined 
to give the federal courts the task of interpreting and applying 
international human rights law.”126  
Taken together, Justice Souter’s reasons for “judicial caution” in 
interpreting the ATS emphasized the interstitial character of the new 
federal common law and its close connections to federal statutes and the 
federal interests reflected in them.  When one thinks of Sosa as a new 
federal common law decision, Justice Souter’s search for the original 
understanding of the ATS becomes more explicable.  The purpose of that 
search is not to carry over an older conception of the law of nations as 
general law into present ATS cases, but simply to follow the maxim, 
arguably given special urgency for federal courts by the Erie decision, 
that courts, in developing common law under a statute, should take 
special pains to recover the understanding of the reach of the statute’s 
terms by those who framed it.  Thus, the primary conclusion of Justice 
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Souter’s effort to discern what was meant by torts in violation of the law 
of nations in 1789 is not that “the law of nations” was understood to be a 
“transcendental” body of general law, but that violations of the law of 
nations were understood as specific, limited, and universally 
condemned.  It was that understanding that Justice Souter sought to 
carry over in analyzing the ATS in the twenty-first century. 
III.  ERIE’S EFFECT ON CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A. Sosa and the Federal Courts’ Posture Toward Customary International 
Law 
As a new federal common law case, Sosa asked the federal courts to 
interpret the meaning of the ATS’s pivotal terms.  This necessarily meant 
engaging in an effort to discern and apply customary international law.  
In pursuing that effort, the Court in Sosa gauged the claim that Alvarez-
Machain’s detention came within the ATS “against the current state of 
international law,” looking to the traditional sources of that law in 
American courts.127  These included treaties, “controlling executive or 
legislative act[s],” judicial decisions, and “the customs and usages of 
civilized nations,” as evidenced in “the works of jurists and 
commentators.”128  No treaties or controlling acts of the executive or 
legislative branches affected the issues in Sosa, so the Court set out to 
determine whether, assuming that the defendant in the case had been 
unjustifiably and arbitrarily detained, “prohibition of arbitrary arrest has 
attained the status of binding customary international law” according to 
the “customs and usages of civilized nations.”129 
In looking to those sources, the Court noted “two well-known 
international agreements,” an article surveying national constitutions, a 
case from the International Court of Justice, and “some authority drawn 
from the federal courts” that all provided some evidence of widespread 
international prohibitions against arbitrary detention and arrest.130  It 
found that those sources, even treated cumulatively, fell well short of 
providing evidence of a “binding customary rule having the specificity 
we require” to be enforced in the federal courts.131  
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Of the international agreements, one, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, did not “of its own force impose obligations as a matter 
of international law” and the other, the International Covenant of Civil 
and Political Rights, had been ratified by the United States on the express 
understanding that it “did not itself create obligations enforceable in the 
federal courts.”132  Consequently, neither of the agreements themselves 
established any binding international rule of law. 
Nor did any of the other customary international law sources.  
United States v. Iran,133 an effort by the United States to obtain relief for 
the “taking of its [Iranian] diplomatic and consular staff as hostages,” 
involved a “far longer and harsher” unauthorized detention than that in 
the Sosa case. 134   “[S]ome authority drawn from the federal courts” 
suggested that arbitrary detention violated customary international law, 
but that authority reflected “a more assertive view of federal judicial 
discretion over claims based on customary international law” than the 
position adopted by the Sosa Court.135  And the article surveying national 
constitutions, which demonstrated that “many nations recognize a norm 
against arbitrary detention,” revealed that “consensus [was only] at a 
high level of generality.” 136   In sum, the detention at issue in Sosa 
“violate[d] no norm of customary international law so well defined as to 
support the creation of a federal remedy.”137 
Once again the interesting feature of the Sosa case was not this 
conclusion, but its jurisprudential implications, especially in light of the 
Erie decision.  Was the Court saying that international norms needed to 
be specific in their content and widespread in their application in every 
case in which the federal courts were considering the effect of customary 
international law on their decisions, or only in cases involving the ATS, 
which had the extraordinary feature of opening up American courts to 
aliens for torts committed outside the boundaries of the United States?  If 
the latter interpretation was intended, Sosa should be seen as a case 
mainly about the reach of the ATS, with no particular implications for 
other customary international law cases.  If the former interpretation 
controlled, the case should be seen as signaling that the Court was 
adopting a cautious view of federal judicial discretion over any claims 
based on customary international law. 
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Although language in the Sosa opinion is more supportive of the 
former view,138 that view immediately raises some difficulties.  If Sosa is 
intended not simply as a case about the reach of the ATS, but about the 
general discretionary use of customary international law by the federal 
courts, it would not seem particularly relevant that the ATS may well 
have been understood, in the 1790s, to encompass only a limited 
category of offenses against the law of nations.  The narrow definition of 
“torts in violation of the law of nations” might inform an understanding 
of the statute, but would not seem to cast any light on the general 
question of how much discretion the federal courts have to incorporate 
customary international law in their decisions.  That question would 
seem to depend, as both the majority and Justice Scalia’s partial dissent 
in Sosa recognized, on the question of whether, after Erie, federal courts 
are given any discretionary power to incorporate customary international 
law into their decisions.  
B. Customary International Law as Federal Common Law 
We have already encountered the apparent effect of the Erie decision 
on the status of customary international law in the federal courts. It was 
plain that at the time the ATS was framed that the “law of nations” was 
understood as “general law”—a source of common law decisions in 
federal as well as state courts—and that this “general law” had come to 
be understood by Erie as the illusory “transcendental body of law 
outside of any particular State but obligatory within it unless and until 
changed by statute.”139  Erie announced that there was no such body of 
law, and thus there was “no federal general common law.” 140  
Consequently, unless Erie was not intended to apply to international law 
cases, it would seem to preclude federal courts from, as Justice Scalia put 
it, “creating . . . federal common law[ ] out of ‘international norms.’”141 
                                                 
138 See, e.g., id. at 2761-62.  “[W]e think courts should require any claim based on the present-
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There would seem to be three ways out of this apparent predicament 
for courts that want to retain some opportunity for federal courts to 
consider customary international law in their decisions.  One such 
possibility has already been discussed:  to treat customary international 
law as new federal common law; law designed to fill in the interstitial 
spaces created by international policies declared by the other federal 
branches.142  Under this approach, customary international law norms 
that reinforce the interests of those other branches might be drawn upon 
as sources for federal court decisions, but only in the context of existing 
federal laws or policies.  Another possibility would be to assume that the 
status of the law of nations in the federal courts after Erie is akin to the 
status of admiralty and maritime law, which is regularly used as the 
basis of federal court decisions affecting vessels on the high seas and 
understood as a general body of law developed from “the custom among 
‘seafaring men.’”143  The third would be to attack the applicability of Erie 
to customary international law cases.  All three approaches would, in the 
end, yield a conception of customary international law as at least 
containing elements of federal common law, but the conception would 
vary considerably with the approach. 
1. Customary International Law as New Federal Common Law 
As noted, there are several reasons for thinking that the Sosa majority 
treated customary international law in the federal courts as an example 
of the new, post-Erie federal common law.144  The cautious reading of 
customary international law sources by the majority, its invitation to 
Congress to provide the federal courts with guidance about possible 
federal “interests” affected by the reception of international norms by 
those courts, the allusions to federal court discretionary power to fashion 
common law rules after Erie, and the majority’s characterization of a 
“door” being left “ajar” for the federal courts to apply customary 
international norms in future cases each suggest that the majority saw 
Sosa as an interstitial, new federal common law case.145 
Justice Scalia pointed out the difficulty with that approach:  the Sosa 
majority opinion does not demonstrate what authorizes the federal 
courts to make customary international law a source of their decisions 
                                                 
142 See supra Part II.B.3. 
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after Erie.146  However one might characterize customary international 
law in the twenty-first century, it does not resemble post-Erie federal 
common law.  It does far more than fill in the interstices of a federal 
statute, it does not necessarily reflect particular federal interests, and it is 
not typically the product of an invitation to the federal courts by 
Congress to help flesh out specific federal policies.  On the contrary, it 
more resembles classic “general” law in the pre-Erie sense:  a body of 
transcendent principles representing the customs and usages of civilized 
nations.  It would seem to be the very sort of law that, when applied by 
the federal courts, represented the “general federal common law” Erie 
stated to be unintelligible. 
So it would seem that if the Sosa majority conceptualized customary 
international law as new federal common law, it should have devoted 
more space to a demonstration of why the reception of customary 
international law by the federal courts furthers the distinctive “federal 
interests” that allegedly drive the formation of judge-made federal 
common law post-Erie.  The majority, however, made no effort to 
provide such a demonstration.  As such, its conception of customary 
international law as federal common law would seem open to the 
charge, as Justice Scalia put it, that federal courts “cannot possibly be 
thought to have been given . . . federal-common-law-making powers 
with regard to the creation of private federal causes of action for 
violations of customary international law.”147 
2. The Admiralty Analogy 
Justice Scalia conceded in his Sosa concurrence that “[t]he rule 
against finding a delegation of [federal court] lawmaking power in a 
grant of jurisdiction is subject to exceptions,” of which “[t]he most firmly 
entrenched [was] admiralty law.”148  It is clear that the development of 
admiralty law in the federal courts has been largely unaffected by Erie, 
even though the “law admiralty and maritime” was early identified as 
one of the sources of “general” law for the federal courts, and remains 
every bit as much a product of international custom and usage as 
customary international law. 
Indeed the use of admiralty law in the federal courts explicitly 
contradicts the Erie generalization that there is no transcendent body of 
law outside the law of a state.  In New York State, for many years, there 
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was no rule of comparative fault in tort cases:  the contributory 
negligence of a plaintiff was a complete bar to recovery.149  After Erie, 
tort suits in federal court that arose out of injuries in New York were 
governed by that rule until it was eventually changed by statute.150  If, 
however, the torts suits in federal courts arose out of actions involving 
vessels in New York harbor or on other navigable waters within the 
state, they were decided by federal courts applying the “general” law of 
admiralty, which had adopted comparative fault.151  With respect to 
those torts, there was a “transcendental body of law outside of any 
particular state” which was obligatory within it, even though for many 
years that body of law was contrary to the tort law of the state, and the 
law was based on the general customs and usages of the sea. 
So perhaps one might imagine customary international law as 
retaining the status of admiralty law in the federal courts after Erie.152  
There would seem to be some difficulties with this approach as well.  
First, the history of admiralty and maritime law, when compared with 
the history of international law, suggests that admiralty law more closely 
resembled the paradigm of a specialized body of customs and practices, 
such as the law merchant, than the law of nations as it evolved.  
Admiralty law and the law merchant involved activities that repeatedly 
crossed territorial boundaries, but were at the same time ongoing and 
recurrent:  accidents on the high seas, transnational insurance claims, 
and commercial transactions.  Those activities were also engaged in by a 
specialized class of persons trained to deal with the distinctive subject 
matter of their vocations.  In short, the idea of admiralty law or the law 
merchant reflecting specialized customs and usages—the products of 
longstanding, on-going practices in distinctive professions—seemed 
intuitively obvious, but with the exception of the offenses against the law 
of nations identified by Blackstone and anticipated in the ATS, one could 
not readily think of comparably widespread, on-going customs and 
practices in the law of nations.  Indeed much of the law of nations, as 
                                                 
149 See, e.g., Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 214 (1920). 
150 1975 N.Y. Laws ch. 69, § 1 (codified at N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1411 (McKinney 1997)). 
151 See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d. 169 (2d. Cir. 1947); Kuleza v. 
Scout Boats, Inc., No. CIV. A. 99-3488, 2000 WL 1201457 (E.D. Pa. 2000). 
152 That would seem to be the assumption governing Jessup, supra note 23. If one 
believed, by the 1930s, that the law of nations was likely to develop into a specialized body 
of customs and usages widely shared by civilized nations, the prospect of customary 
international law eventually approximating the law merchant or admiralty law might not 
have seemed remote.  Moreover, as previously noted, the idea that American state courts, 
who remained free to incorporate customary international law into their decisions after 
Erie, would serve as comparable to the federal courts for disputes involving international 
law issues seemed extremely unlikely. 
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Blackstone recognized, consisted of negotiated agreements among 
sovereign entities, reflecting the parochial interests and concerns of those 
nations.153  Beyond that realm of treaties and executive agreements, the 
“law of nations” seemed very far from being a rich source of universal 
norms of conduct. 
Moreover, Article III of the Constitution, taken together with the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, anticipated that the federal courts would apply a 
law of admiralty.  Article III gave the federal district courts “exclusive 
original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction,”154 but Section 9 of the Judiciary Act “sav[ed] to suitors, in 
all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is 
competent to give it.”155  This meant that in some cases that would 
qualify for the admiralty jurisdiction,156 individuals could elect to sue in 
a state court.  One purpose of the arrangement may have been to 
distinguish admiralty law, as handed down in the federal courts, from 
state common law,157 and in a 1917 case the Court said that  
There is no doubt that, throughout the entire life of the 
nation under the Constitution, state courts not only have 
exercised concurrent jurisdiction with the courts of 
admiralty . . . but that in exercising such jurisdiction they 
have . . . adopted as rules of decision their local 
laws . . . . recognizing no obligation . . . to apply the law 
maritime.158  
Whatever the law admiralty and maritime was, then it was federal law.  
The law of nations was not comparably treated.159 
                                                 
153 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *66-67. 
154 1 Stat. 76-77 (1789). 
155 Id. 
156 The “savings clause” of the Judiciary Act of 1789 was limited to in personam suits 
arising in an admiralty context.  In rem suits, involving ships as opposed to their crews, 
could only be brought in admiralty courts. 
157 Another purpose may have been to allow litigants in cases that could qualify for the 
admiralty jurisdiction the opportunity to have their suits tried before juries, which were 
only available in common law courts. 
158 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 254 (1917). 
159 One could argue that since the law of nations was originally thought of as “general” 
law that federal as well as state courts could draw upon, it should now be regarded as 
included within the “Laws of the United States” in Article III, § 2 of the Constitution and 
within the Supremacy Clause of Article VI.  See Dodge, supra note 25, at 101-08.  But this 
argument is not historically based, because it assumes that after Erie, law of nations 
decisions made by the federal courts would be “new” federal common law decisions, and 
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The admiralty analogy for customary international law, then, was 
surely not in place at the time Erie was decided, and despite the growing 
number of international conventions, protocols, and agreements that 
have emerged since, one can hardly say that customary international law 
has attained anything like the doctrinal thickness and specificity of 
admiralty or maritime law.  Indeed there has been a noticeable trend on 
the part of the United States, in the late twentieth century, to enter into 
international conventions or agreements with the express reservation 
that their policies are not enforceable in American courts.160  
3. Rethinking Erie 
The application of customary international law by the federal courts 
would be much facilitated, of course, if the jurisprudential premise of the 
Erie decision—that there is no such thing as “general” federal common 
law independent of the common law of individual states—were 
rethought.  It is apparent that both the Sosa majority and Justice Scalia 
regard Erie as significantly affecting the discretion of the federal courts to 
apply customary international law as common law.  Justice Scalia, in 
fact, treats Erie as precluding that discretion, and the majority lists Erie as 
one of the principal reasons for adopting a cautious approach to the 
adoption of customary international law by the federal courts.  But is the 
premise of Erie sound?  Is there no such thing as general federal common 
law? 
For a decision with such far-reaching effects (Erie overruled 
thousands of cases and has dramatically affected choice of law issues in 
the federal courts ever since its promulgation) the opinion in Erie is 
remarkably cryptic, assertive, and quite possibly wrong-headed as a 
matter of historical and jurisprudential analysis. 
In Erie, a citizen of Pennsylvania was walking at night on a 
“commonly used beaten footpath,” which ran for a short distance 
alongside railroad tracks near Hughestown, Pennsylvania.161  He was 
struck by an object that projected from one of the open cars of a moving 
freight train operated by the Erie Railroad.  He brought a tort action for 
                                                                                                             
thus binding on the states.  That does not seem consistent with nineteenth-century practice.  
See Koh, supra note 1, at 1830. 
160 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 (ratified by the United States on June 8, 1992) (1 MULTILATERAL TREATIES 
DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL: STATUS AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2005, at 297-98 (2006) 
provides a listing of the United States’ “declarations, understandings, and reservations” 
with respect to the covenant). 
161 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 69 (1938). 
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his injuries in federal court in New York, alleging that the railroad had 
been negligent in allowing the object to project from the freight car, and 
that as a passenger on a railroad right of way of which “the public has 
made open and notorious use,” he was owed a duty of care by the 
railroad.162  He received a jury verdict of $30,000 for his injuries and the 
New York Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the verdict.163  In doing so, 
that court declared that the Pennsylvania courts’ understanding of tort 
law, which treated persons using longitudinal rights of way near 
railroad tracks as trespassers who were owed no duty of ordinary care 
by railroads, did not govern the case even though the accident occurred 
in Pennsylvania.  Instead, the case turned on the federal courts’ 
understanding of general law.164  Under general law, as handed down in 
previous federal court tort decisions, pedestrians walking on 
longitudinal rights of way were not trespassers, and the railroad had a 
duty to refrain from negligently injuring them.165 
As such, the Erie case presented a conflict between federal and state 
courts’ understandings of the applicable general law, one comparable to 
a conflict between the laws of two states that had different tort rules.  
Although that sort of conflict had been routine in the American legal 
system from its beginnings, the Erie case dramatized one feature of it, 
that cases involving citizens of different states might have different 
outcomes depending on whether they were filed in federal or state 
court.166   The Erie case also underscored the strategic aspects of the 
difference between state and federal tort rules, which was highlighted by 
the fact that many industrial corporations did business in states in which 
they were not incorporated.167  Had the plaintiff in Erie elected to file in 
Pennsylvania state court, he would have been deemed a trespasser and 
denied recovery.  By having the good fortune to have been injured by an 
out of state corporation, he was able to file in a federal court with more 
favorable tort rules. 
This phenomenon—”forum shopping”—was not in itself a product 
of the federal courts’ discretion to ground their common law decisions 
on “general law.”  But when combined with the frequent diversity of 
citizenship cases produced by the increased number of lawsuits 
involving corporations engaged in interstate business, it provided 
                                                 
162 Id. at 69-70. 
163 Id. at 70. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 See id. at 74-75. 
167 Id. at 75-77. 
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opportunities for blatantly strategic use of differing federal and state 
common law rules.  An example of this was presented by a case 
involving two competing taxicab companies, both incorporated in 
Kentucky, who sought to do business at the Bowling Green, Kentucky 
station of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad.168  The railroad sought 
to give the Brown and Yellow Taxicab Company, incorporated in 
Kentucky, the exclusive privilege of soliciting business at the Bowling 
Green station, which was illegal under the Kentucky courts’ 
understanding of the applicable law. 169  In order to circumvent that 
Kentucky rule, the Brown and Yellow Company reincorporated in the 
state of Tennessee, executed an exclusive contract to do business with the 
railroad, and then filed suit in federal district court for the district of 
western Kentucky to enjoin its competitor, the Black and White Taxicab 
Company, from competing with it to do business at the Bowling Green 
station.170  Exclusive contracts to do business were permitted under the 
federal courts’ understanding of the general law, so the Brown and 
Yellow Company succeeded in obtaining the injunction, and the 
Supreme Court of the United States ultimately affirmed.171 
Black and White Taxicab Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab Co. produced 
Justice Holmes’s dictum about the nonexistence of a transcendental body 
of law apart from the law of the state.172  But there was nothing about the 
forum-shopping aspects of the case that compelled the dictum.  The 
Brown and Yellow Taxicab Company and the Louisville and Nashville 
Railroad had simply taken advantage of a favorable common law rule in 
one forum that had not been available to them in another.  Nothing 
about the federal status of the rule was important:  it was just a different 
rule about contracts restraining competition from the prevailing rule in 
Kentucky.  
Nonetheless, Justice Brandeis’s opinion for the Court in Erie 
concluded that the idea of federal common law was incoherent.  He 
made three arguments for this proposition, one of them historical, 
another apparently prudential, and the third constitutional.  Each of the 
arguments was of dubious validity. 173   Justice Brandeis’s historical 
argument was an effort to read Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 as 
                                                 
168 Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928). 
169 Id. at 522-23. 
170 Id. at 523. 
171 Id. at 525-26. 
172 Id. at 533. 
173 For a detailed dissection of Justice Brandeis’s role in the Erie case, see EDWARD A. 
PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION (2000). 
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a mandate to bind federal courts to the laws of the states in which they 
sat.  The operative language of the section read,  
The laws of the several states, except where the 
Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States 
otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules 
of decisions in trials at common law in the courts of the 
United States, in cases where they apply.174  
In Swift v. Tyson, a case decided in 1842, Justice Story had interpreted 
the word “laws” in the section to refer only to state statutes, “long 
established local customs having the force of laws,” and some settled 
court decisions on questions of local law.175  He gave two reasons for this 
conclusion.  One was that “[i]n the ordinary use of language” the 
decisions of courts were not considered “laws,” but “only evidence of 
what the laws are.”  Judicial decisions might be “re-examined, reversed, 
and qualified by the courts”; they were sometimes “defective,” “ill-
founded,” or “incorrect.”176   Justice Story’s reasoning presupposed a 
declaratory theory of judicial decision-making, in which “law” existed 
independent of the decisions of courts, which discerned it and applied it 
to particular cases.  When judicial decisions discerned the law 
erroneously, the decisions were not law at all. 
The other reason why Justice Story treated “laws” in the Judiciary 
Act of 1789 as referring to “the rules and enactments” promulgated by 
state legislatures, or “long-standing established local customs having the 
force of laws,”177 is that such a reading was consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence in common law cases prior to Swift.178  In its early 
nineteenth-century common law cases, such as those dealing with land 
title disputes, contracts, and commercial transactions, the Court tended 
to defer to state common law rules or customs only when the issues 
involved, as Story put it in Swift, “matters immovable and intraterritorial 
in their nature and character.” 179   The best example was land 
transactions.  In other cases, especially in commercial law cases, the 
Court tended to ground its decisions “upon general reasoning and legal 
analogies,” drawing on “general principles and doctrines.” 180   Thus 
                                                 
174 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20,  § 34, 1 Stat. 73. 





180 Id. at 19. 
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“laws” in the Judiciary Act could not mean all state common law 
decisions, as in many cases the federal courts were free to disregard 
them.  
Story did not advance a third reason which has assumed greater 
importance over the years.  He, his early nineteenth-century 
contemporaries, and the framers of the Judiciary Act of 1789 understood 
the word “several” in the phrase “laws of the several states” not as a 
synonym for “separate,” but as a designation of a collective rather than 
an individual entity.  “Several,” in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-
century usage, was used in contradistinction to “respective,” which 
meant in an individual capacity.  Thus, the “several states” meant “the 
individual states taken as a unit,” and the phrase “laws of the several 
states” meant “the various local statutes and customs of those states, 
viewed collectively.”  Even if the word “laws” in the Judiciary Act was 
meant to include common law decisions in addition to local statutes and 
customs, the phrase “several states” assured that in declaring “rules of 
decision,” the federal courts could peruse the common law decisions of 
all the states.  When, over time, the word “several” came to take on the 
meaning of “separate,” commentators were tempted to read the 
Judiciary Act as requiring federal courts to consult the common law 
decisions of the “separate” (individual) states in which they sat, but this 
reading was anachronistic.181  Justice Brandeis, however, declared Justice 
Story’s construction of the Judiciary Act to be “erroneous” and read the 
Act as meaning that “the federal courts . . . would apply as their rules of 
decision the law of the state, unwritten as well as written.”182  That 
conclusion was historically defective. 
Justice Brandeis’s next argument recited the facts of the Taxicab Co. 
case and then suggested that such forum-shopping engendered 
“mischievous results,”183 which he blamed on Story’s assertion in Swift v. 
                                                 
181 Justice Brandeis relied on Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal 
Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49 (1926).  Warren’s reading of the Judiciary Act 
failed to take into account the eighteenth-century use of “several” as being in contradiction 
to “respective.”  See WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789 
(1990).  Ritz’s interpretation of “several,” however, sometimes seems to preclude the 
application of the term to individual units in a collective mass.  This seems implausible: 
consider Article I, section 2 of the Constitution, which states that the House of 
Representatives “shall be composed of Members chosen every second year by the People of 
the several States.”  In that phrase “People” clearly refers to a collective entity, but 
nonetheless elections for the House are conducted on a state-by-state basis.  I am indebted 
to Caleb Nelson for this example. 
182 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72-73 (1938). 
183 Id. at 74. 
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Tyson that the federal courts declared general law in many cases.184  One 
result was that Swift “introduced grave discrimination by noncitizens 
against citizens.” 185   That statement was not exactly accurate.  The 
privilege of initially selecting a jurisdiction in diversity cases went to 
plaintiffs, who might or might not be non-citizens.186  But that privilege 
did not necessarily result in discrimination against citizens.  For 
example, had the plaintiff in Erie been a citizen of a state with a favorable 
common law tort rule for passengers negligently injured while walking 
on longitudinal railroad rights of way, he might well have filed in state 
court.  But if he had, and the Erie Railroad had not liked the rule, it 
could, under the applicable removal statutes,187 have removed the case to 
a federal court.  So in that example any difference between state and 
federal common rules engendered by Swift did not create any 
discrimination at all. 
There was, however, a scenario in which non-citizens of the forum 
state were advantaged against citizens of that state.  It came about when 
non-citizen plaintiffs preferred the forum state’s common law rule, and 
thus brought suit in state court against citizen defendants.  In that 
instance defendants could not remove the case to federal court.  The 
removal statutes thus clearly benefited non-citizens in some instances, 
but that was not a function of the Swift decision.  Indeed had Congress 
been troubled by this “grave discrimination” against citizens in some 
diversity cases, it could simply have repealed the section of the 
applicable removal statute preventing citizen defendants from removing 
a diversity case to a federal court.   
To be sure, Swift increased the possibility that plaintiffs in diversity 
of citizenship cases might have a choice between competing federal and 
state rules.  But the choice itself was a function of the fact that the federal 
courts were available for diversity cases.  Forum-shopping was not 
invariably a product of Swift.  It existed whenever parties had the option 
of filing cases in multiple jurisdictions with different common law rules, 
a possibility that was enhanced with the growth in America of 
transactions and contacts that crossed state lines.  A citizen of one state 
                                                 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 PURCELL, supra note 171, at 162, states that Brandeis’s statement of the 
“discrimination” allegedly created by Swift was misleading, noting that, “As plaintiff, a 
citizen might sue a non-citizen in either federal or state court in the citizen’s home state, 
and a non-citizen had the same choice.” 
187 The applicable removal statutes are now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000). 
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suing a citizen of another state sometimes had a choice among 
competing state common law rules as well. 
But Justice Brandeis concluded that the Swift doctrine “rendered 
impossible equal protection of the law.” 188   Despite that evocative 
language, he did not mean that Swift violated the Equal Protection 
Clause.189  He meant that it “made rights enjoyed under the unwritten 
‘general law’ vary according to whether enforcement was sought in the 
state or in the federal court,” as well as his claim that Swift favored non-
citizens over citizens. 190   His statement that Swift itself affected 
“rights . . . under the unwritten ‘general law’” was no more accurate than 
his claim that it discriminated against citizens. 
The “general law,” as understood from the time of the ATS up to the 
Erie decision, was simply a term for the aggregate of sources used by 
courts in making common law decisions.  A state court, in common law 
cases, was free to consult the decisions of other states as well as its own, 
and was free to reject another state’s line of decisions, just as a federal 
court was free to follow or reject state decisions.  Over time, under the 
Swift regime, federal courts tended to carve out their own doctrinal 
lines—that was why informed counsel forum-shopped in diversity 
cases—and their jurisprudence on particular common law issues tended 
to become as predictable as that of state courts.  
But Justice Brandeis’s statement that Swift made common law rights 
vary depending on whether a party was in state or federal court was not 
correct.  Swift merely allowed the federal courts to survey common law 
authorities from a variety of quarters in developing their common law 
jurisprudence.  That freedom of choice was also enjoyed by state courts.  
Parties suing in a federal court in a particular state did not necessarily 
have different common law rights from parties suing in that state’s 
courts: their rights depended on the doctrinal lines of the respective 
courts.  Once again, the choice between doctrinal lines afforded to some 
plaintiffs was a function of the diversity of citizenship jurisdictional 
                                                 
188 Erie, 304 U.S. at 75. 
189 He could not have intended the phrase “rendered impossible equal protection of the 
law” as a constitutional argument for three reasons.  First, Swift was handed down in 1842, 
and there was no Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution until 1868.  Second, after the 
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, no constitutional challenges to Swift’s conception of 
general federal common law were advanced until Erie itself, and those challenges were 
advanced in response to a request by the Court.  Third, the constitutional objections to Swift 
advanced in Brandeis’s opinion, as we will see, were based on separation-of-powers 
considerations, not on the Equal Protection Clause. 
190 Erie, 304 U.S. at 74-75. 
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rules, not of Swift.  Justice Brandeis himself noted that “The injustice and 
confusion incident to the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson have been repeatedly 
urged as reasons for abolishing or limiting diversity of citizenship 
jurisdiction.”191 
Justice Brandeis’s prudential arguments against Swift—the “injustice 
and confusion” it had allegedly spawned 192 —may have seemed 
superficially attractive, especially as the interstate business of 
corporations gave them more opportunities to make choices between 
federal and state court doctrinal lines.  But the arguments ignored the 
fact that so long as American common law was jurisdiction-specific, and 
so long as different state courts adopted contrasting doctrinal rules, 
strategic filings by lawyers, and even the choice of residency by 
individuals and corporations, were possible.  Justice Brandeis, however, 
had a third argument to advance in Erie, a constitutional argument.  
Below is the heart of the argument he set out: 
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution 
or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case 
is the law of the state.  And whether the law of the state 
shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its 
highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal 
concern.  There is no federal general common law.  
Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of 
common law applicable in a state whether they be local 
in their nature or “general,” be they commercial law or a 
part of the law of torts.  And no clause in the 
Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the 
federal courts. . . . The fallacy underlying the rule 
declared in Swift v. Tyson is made clear by Mr. Justice 
Holmes.  The doctrine rests on the assumption that there 
is “a transcendental body of law outside of any 
particular State but obligatory within it unless and until 
changed by statute,” that the federal courts have the 
power to use their judgment as to what the rules of 
common law are; and that in the federal courts “the 
parties are entitled to an independent judgment on 
matters of general law”: . . . “[L]aw in the sense in which 
courts speak of it today does not exist without some 
definite authority behind it.  The common law so far as it 
                                                 
191 Id. at 77. 
192 Id. 
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is enforced in a State, whether called common law or 
not, is not the common law generally but the law of that 
State existing by the authority of that State without 
regard to what it may have been in England or 
anywhere else.  “The authority and only authority is the 
State, and if that be so, the voice adopted by the State as 
its own [whether it be of its Legislature or its Supreme 
Court] should utter the last word.”  Thus the doctrine of 
Swift v. Tyson is, as Mr. Justice Holmes said, “an 
unconstitutional assumption of powers by courts of the 
United States which no lapse of time or respectable array 
of opinion should make us hesitate to correct.”193 
Justice Brandeis’s constitutional argument was a mixture of two 
propositions, neither of which was explicitly grounded in the 
Constitution itself, but both of which could arguably be inferred from its 
structure.  The first proposition was that the federal government under 
the Constitution was one of limited powers, and that the powers of the 
departments of that government, such as Congress and the federal 
courts, were coextensive.  The second was that the federal courts could 
not derive common law rulemaking authority from any source other 
than the powers of the federal government.  Thus, Justice Brandeis 
reasoned, not only could the federal courts not declare common rules in 
areas where Congress had no power to act, they could not declare such 
rules in areas where Congress had not acted.  Both propositions, on 
analysis, reveal themselves to be historically inaccurate and 
jurisprudentially anachronistic.194 
In the early years of the American constitutional republic there was 
general agreement that the federal government was one of limited 
powers, although there were competing theories about the relationship 
between the states and the federal government, as well as competing 
theories about the power relationships among the judicial, legislative, 
and executive departments of the federal government.  Moreover, some 
                                                 
193 Id. at 78-79. 
194 For efforts to defend the coherence or efficacy of the propositions driving Justice 
Brandeis’s constitutional argument in Erie, see PURCELL, supra note 173, at 172-85; Ernest A. 
Young, Sorting Out the Debate over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 404-32 
(2002).  Despite the high quality of those efforts, neither defends the historical accuracy of 
Justice Brandeis’s argument, and both concede that the argument pivots on the 
jurisprudential assumption, not shared by the framers or, for that matter, mainstream 
American constitutionalists until the early twentieth century, that judicial interpretation 
needs to be seen as another version of lawmaking instead of the discernment and 
application of preexisting, immanent principles of law. 
White: A Customary International Law of Torts
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
798 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
constitutional theorists of the period assumed that the powers of 
departments of the same governmental body were coextensive, so that 
each time Congress conferred jurisdiction on the federal courts, it 
conferred power on them to declare common law rules, which Congress 
could then modify by statute. 195   Some theorists believed that the 
coextensive powers of departments of the federal government would 
enable it to become an effective unit of government, while others feared 
that they would lead to unlimited federal power and the eventual 
eradication of the influence of the states.196  However, both sides in the 
debate took for granted that once Congress created federal courts, the 
jurisdiction of those courts gave them the power to declare common law 
rules.197 
Few constitutional theorists of the early republican period, however, 
believed that the authority of the federal courts to declare common law 
rules was confined to Congress’s authority to pass legislation.198  They 
recognized jurisdictional and substantive limits on the power of the 
federal courts:  the Constitution provided that Congress could expand or 
limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts as it saw fit, and Congress 
could alter the decisions of those courts by statute.  But far from 
assuming that because “no clause in the Constitution purports to confer 
[the power to declare substantive rules of common law] upon the federal 
courts,” 199  those courts had no such power; early republican 
commentators made a sharp distinction between the jurisdictional and 
substantive rule declaration powers of the federal courts, and treated the 
                                                 
195 See WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, supra note 56, at 122-27; G. 
Edward White, Recovering Coterminous Power Theory, 14 NOVA L. REV. 155 (1989).  
Coterminous power theory of the early republican period also took for granted that if 
Congress acted to modify a rule of the federal courts by statute, those courts had 
jurisdiction to develop further rules in applying the statute in particular cases.  The 
assumption that the powers of departments of the federal government were coextensive 
drove some commentators to the belief that “consolidation” of federal power would 
eventually take place, greatly reducing the powers of the states.  For illustrations, see 
WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, supra note 56, at 124-27. 
196 For examples, see White, Recovering Conterminous Power Theory, supra note 195. 
197 Whatever the meaning of Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, it presupposed that 
the “courts of the United States” would declare “rules of decision.” 
198 One can find occasional evidence of this view, as in Justice Samuel Chase’s comment 
in the case of United States v. Worrall, that “the common law authority . . . has not been 
conferred upon the government of the United States, which is a government in other 
respects also of a limited jurisdiction.”  2 U.S. (2. Dall.) 384, 395 (C.C.D. Pa. 1798) (emphasis 
omitted).  But most commentators did not agree that the jurisdictional limitations on the 
federal courts limited their authority to declare substantive legal rules once jurisdiction had 
been given. 
199 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
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Constitution’s language, which defined the “judicial power” of the 
federal courts as extending to “all Cases, in Law and Equity,” as giving 
the federal courts power to declare substantive common law rules.200  
Brandeis seemed to share the framing generation’s view that the 
legislative and judicial powers of the federal government were 
coextensive.  He also seemed to conclude that this meant that the federal 
courts could not declare rules on subjects which Congress could not 
constitutionally legislate.201  However, that conclusion assumes that the 
only source of the federal courts’ power to declare common law rules 
was Congress’s comparable power to pass legislation. 
That assumption was not shared by early republican constitutional 
theorists.  They distinguished between the constitutional authority of 
Congress to legislate on certain subjects and the jurisprudential authority 
of courts—federal and state—to declare general law.  Had there been a 
provision in the Constitution stating that “the law to be applied in all 
cases in the federal courts shall be the law of the respective States,” 
Justice Brandeis’s conclusion might have been warranted.202  But there is 
no such provision.  In the absence of such provision, one should look to 
the background assumptions of the framers and practice around the time 
of the Constitution’s framing.  Not only is there no evidence that 
constitutional theorists believed that the only common law that courts 
could declare was “the law of the State,” but there is ample evidence, as 
we have seen, that federal courts regularly declared “general” common 
law rules. 
                                                 
200 See, e.g., United States v. Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. 619 (1813).  Joseph Story stated, 
I admit in the most explicit terms, that the courts of the United States 
are courts of limited jurisdiction, and cannot exercise any authorities, 
which are not confided in them by the constitution and laws made in 
pursuance thereof. But I do contend, that once an authority is lawfully 
given, the nature and extent of that authority . . . must be regulated by 
all rules of the common law. 
Id.; Harrison Gray Otis’s argument in the Congressional debates over the constitutionality 
of the Alien and Sedition Act, 5th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1797-98), 2145-57; Tucker, supra note 104, 
at 429-30.  “[T]he maxims and rules of proceeding [of the common law] are to be adhered 
to . . . in cases [where] the cognizance . . . is by the constitution vested in the federal courts.”  
Tucker, supra note 104, at 429-30. 
201 See PURCELL, supra note 173, at 172-73. 
202 The “law of the respective States” might still be conceived as “general” law: that is, 
law discerned by appeal to “principle,” which might include a survey of decisions in other 
jurisdictions, as well as law discerned by “authority,” which would mean a canvass of 
relevant decisions in the state in question. 
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The absence of historical or analytical support for Justice Brandeis’s 
first proposition suggests that his constitutional argument actually 
turned on his second, which was as much jurisprudentially grounded as 
it was constitutionally.  The logic of his second proposition was as 
follows.  The idea of a “transcendental body of law outside of any 
particular state but obligatory within it” was a fiction.  The “law” of a 
state consisted of the positivist enactments of courts or legislatures in 
that state:  there was no body of law in existence in that state 
independent of those enactments.  Federal courts could not derive their 
power to declare common law rules from any transcendental “general” 
law as it did not exist.  Also, because the Constitution had not given the 
federal courts any express power to declare rules, they were, under Swift, 
often exceeding the powers of Congress or usurping the powers of state 
courts in fashioning “general” common law decisions.203  This was an 
“unconstitutional assumption of powers by Courts of the United States,” 
apparently violating both separation-of-powers and federalism 
principles.204 
Let us trace out the logical implications of this argument. It would 
seem to rest on at least one of two premises.  The first is that the 
allocation of authority between state legislatures and state courts is an 
issue of state constitutional law; there is no requirement in the federal 
Constitution that lawmaking needs to be vested in state legislatures 
rather than courts.  As Justice Brandeis put it, “whether the law of the 
state shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest 
court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern.”205  Thus, to the 
extent that Swift’s interpretation of the Judiciary Act of 1789 permits 
federal courts to substitute their views for those of state courts on state 
common law issues, it is inconsistent with the principles of federalism 
and separation of powers.  Stated more precisely, it is inconsistent with 
an understanding of the way in which restraints on the federal 
government mandated by the Constitution interact with separation of 
powers principles established by state constitutions. 
The second premise is more openly jurisprudential: the idea that 
federal judges merely “declare” transcendental legal principles, as 
opposed to engaging in positivistic lawmaking, is jurisprudentially 
                                                 
203 As Brandeis stated in his Erie opinion, under Swift “[t]he federal courts assumed, in 
the broad field of ‘general law,’ the power to declare rules of decision which Congress was 
confessedly without power to enact as statutes.”  Erie, 304 U.S. at 72. 
204 Id. at 79-80 (quoting Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 
U.S. 518 (1928)). 
205 Id. at 78. 
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unsound.  Justice Brandeis seems to have intended a constitutional basis 
for this premise as well, reasoning that because the Constitution created 
a federal government of limited powers, the scope of the federal courts’ 
power to declare substantive rules needed to be commensurate with the 
scope of Congress’s power to displace the authority of the states.  He 
suggested that, in following Swift, the federal courts had “invaded rights 
which in our opinion are reserved by the Constitution to the several 
states.”206  By using the phrase “reserved” he was probably alluding to 
the Tenth Amendment, and certainly invoking the model of a federal 
government of limited, enumerated powers surrounded by states that 
could exercise supplemental, residual authority.207  But there is not much 
evidence, from the framing generation and most of the nineteenth 
century, that the model of reserved powers was designed to constrain 
federal judicial power.  A sharp distinction between judicial decision-
making and lawmaking remained in place.208  It is not at all clear that 
nineteenth-century interpreters of the Constitution, who took its 
combination of enumerated federal powers in Article I and the Tenth 
Amendment to limit the scope of federal legislative power, saw those 
provisions as affecting the scope of federal judicial power as well.  
Federal courts repeatedly made decisions, throughout the nineteenth 
century, in areas that were assumed to be outside the scope of 
Congress’s regulatory authority.  
Finally, it is hard to see how the string of jurisprudential assertions 
made by Holmes, which Justice Brandeis quoted in his Erie opinion, adds 
up to an authoritative constitutional argument.  Holmes’s claim that after 
Swift v. Tyson there was “a transcendental body of law outside of any 
particular state but obligatory within it unless and until changed by 
statute” was incorrect.  State courts were not bound by federal common 
law decisions as they could reject them in the same manner that they 
rejected the common law decisions of other states.  His other 
characterizations of Swift, that it stood for the propositions that federal 
courts could make common law rules and that parties in the federal 
courts were “entitled to an independent judgment on matters of general 
law,”209 were correct, but unremarkable: that was the whole point of 
                                                 
206 Id. at 80. 
207 See PURCELL, supra note 173, at 178-80. 
208 For example, see the comment by Justice David Brewer in an 1893 address before the 
New York State Bar Association: courts “make no laws” and “establish no policy. . . . Their 
functions are limited to seeing that popular action does not trespass on right and justice as 
it exists in written constitutions and natural law.” Brewer, The Movement of Coercion, 16 
PROC.N.Y.ST. B.A. 37 (1893). 
209 Erie, 304 U.S. at 79. 
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allowing the federal courts discretion to fashion “general” or local rules, 
depending on the subject matter of a case.  
Holmes next claimed, in the passage quoted by Justice Brandeis, that 
because “law in the sense in which courts speak of it today”210 was the 
positivistic edicts of governmental authority, “[t]he common law so far 
as it is enforced in a State . . . is not the common law generally but the 
law of that State existing by the authority of that State.”211  But that 
statement was, before Erie, either a truism or incorrect.212  If by the 
common law enforced in a state Holmes meant the precise rules 
articulated by the highest courts of that state, the statement was obvious.  
But if by the common law enforced in a state he meant the common law 
decisions handed down in courts, both federal and state, that sat within 
the state’s borders, that “law” could, and prior to Erie did, include 
“general” as well as state rules and principles.  
Finally, Holmes asserted that since the “only authority” within states 
was “the State,” the “voice adopted by the State as its own,” whether 
that of state legislatures or state courts, “should utter the last word.”213  
This comment assumed, as modern commentators on the Erie decision 
have continued to assume, that when the framers of a state constitution 
create courts as well as a legislature for that state, they are treating the 
courts, as well as the legislature, as a lawmaking body; however, that is 
the very assumption Story denied in Swift.  He treated the decisions of 
courts not as laws, but as mere evidence of the law, subject to correction 
and even negation.  Assuming that Story’s views were conventionally 
accepted, the creation of a judiciary in state constitutions would have 
been seen, by their eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century framers, as 
equivalent to the creation of Article III federal courts by Congress.  Those 
courts were empowered to hear cases and to apply common law 
principles in deciding those cases, but the power of judicial substantive 
rule declaration that resulted from such was not treated as the equivalent 
of lawmaking.  There is no reason to suppose that the drafters of state 
constitutions reasoned any differently.  However, Justices Holmes and 
Brandeis treated them as informed by the assumptions of legal realism.  
Thus, it was hard to see how the Swift doctrine amounted to “an 
unconstitutional assumption of powers by courts of the United States.”  
                                                 
210 Black & White Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. at 533. 
211 Id. 
212 See Erie, 304 U.S. at 64. 
212 Id. 
213 Black & White Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. at 535. 
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It was equally hard to see how the idea of a “transcendental body of law 
outside of any particular state” was threatening or incoherent.  That 
body of law was not obligatory within the state unless a state court chose 
to accept it; and, being little more than a canvass of the common law 
decisions of state jurisdictions, it was no more incoherent than those 
decisions.   
In sum, not a single argument on which the Erie decision rested can 
be sustained on analysis.  Even the prudential argument about the 
“injustice and confusion” engendered by forum-shopping, assuming that 
it amounts to more than the ordinary injustice and confusion resulting 
from different common law rules in different state jurisdictions, is not an 
argument against Swift or the idea of “general” federal common law.  It 
may well be that the Swift doctrine, when combined with the expanding 
interstate business of corporations and the ease with which they could 
incorporate themselves in one state or another, increased the strategic 
dimensions of diversity jurisdiction suits.214  However, the root cause of 
that problem was not Swift, but the changing nature of corporate 
enterprise in the twentieth century.215  Erie, at bottom, seems to have 
been a determined effort to get the federal courts out of the business of 
fashioning their own common law rules. 216   Since the Erie opinion 
supplied no satisfactory historical, analytical, constitutional, 
jurisprudential, or even prudential reason for doing so, it reduces itself 
to a belief that somehow state courts would advance more felicitous 
outcomes in common law cases than the federal courts.   
IV.  RETHINKING THE STATUS OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AFTER 
ERIE 
Despite the weakness of the arguments justifying the Erie decision, it 
seems unlikely that it will be overruled in the foreseeable future.  In the 
several decades during which Erie has been in place, countless litigants 
have had an expectation that the federal courts would track state law 
decisions in most cases.  Unsettling such expectation furnishes the 
strongest reason against modifying the Erie rules.  But at the same time, 
it should be recognized that the combination of “new,” post-Erie pockets 
                                                 
214 See PURCELL, supra note 173, at 149 (indicating that “Swift and diversity jurisdiction . . . 
magnified the importance of forum control and helped stimulate a variety of rival 
techniques to secure and deny access to the national courts”). 
215 See id. at 142-43. 
216 Purcell’s Brandeis and the Progressive Constitution, supra note 173, can be seen as an 
extended effort to demonstrate that Erie was “animated by political and social 
considerations” and was “a product of Brandeis’s personal values and motives.”  Id. at 133. 
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of federal common law and the choice-of-law decisions that remain in 
many cases involving citizens of different states has resulted in the post-
Erie system not being as predictable, from the point of view of litigants, 
as might have been anticipated when Erie was decided.  The fact 
remains, after Erie, that the federal courts often have opportunities to 
develop their own common law rules.  
A. Post-Erie Federal Common Law as General Law 
In this setting, the weakness of the historical, jurisprudential, and 
constitutional arguments undergirding Erie might be said to come into 
play even if Erie’s basic holding that federal courts are expected to track 
the common law of the states in which they sit remains in place.  One 
might characterize Erie as standing for two propositions.  The first, 
arguably more durable, proposition is that having the federal courts 
track state law reduces forum-shopping and helps eliminate the anomaly 
of two courts in the same jurisdiction declaring incompatible common 
law rules.  The second is that the idea of a general federal common law is 
jurisprudentially incoherent and should not be perpetuated.  As 
presented thus far, the arguments supporting the latter proposition seem 
dubious, and the proposition’s significance is greatly reduced once the 
federal courts are conceded to have power to develop pockets of federal 
common law in areas where a congressional statute or other policy 
signals a discrete federal interest. 
Because of the categorical statement in Erie that there is no “general 
federal common law,” post-Erie efforts by the federal courts to develop 
common law rules to interpret a federal statute or policy have been 
characterized as being based on something other than “general” 
principles.217  However, this would seem to rest on a misunderstanding 
of the concept of “general” law invited by Erie.  “General law,” as that 
concept evolved in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, rested on 
two quite different ideas.  One was that courts, state or federal, could 
draw on a variety of sources, inside or outside a particular jurisdiction, 
to develop legal principle on which their decisions rested.  The other was 
that those “general” principles had a preexisting, immanent 
jurisprudential status: they were “out there” in the legal universe for 
judges to discover and to apply to cases.  
The latter meaning of “general” law was the meaning described as 
“transcendental,” caricatured and abandoned in Erie’s dictum that “there 
                                                 
217 The typical characterization is “new federal common law.” See Friendly, supra note 24. 
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is no general federal common law.”  But in making that statement, the 
Erie decision did not abandon the former meaning of “general” law.  
Indeed the passages from Justice Holmes that Justice Brandeis quoted 
made it clear that the only authoritative common law that retained any 
intelligibility after Erie—the law of the states—could be “general” law.  
Nothing prevented a state from grounding its common law decisions on 
what was referred to in the nineteenth century as arguments from 
“principle,” that is, a canvass of relevant authorities inside or outside the 
state.  
As such, it is a misnomer to think of post-Erie “federal common law” 
as other than “general” law in the former sense of that term.  Indeed it is 
abundantly clear that in the areas of designated federal interest in which 
the federal courts are conceded power to develop post-Erie common law 
rules, they regularly canvass a variety of jurisdictional and academic 
sources in doing so. 
One recent case can provide an illustration.218  In Wells v. Liddy219 the 
plaintiff sued G. Gordon Liddy for allegedly defamatory remarks he 
made about her in several speeches, including one on a cruise ship.  Both 
Wells and Liddy were citizens of the United States, and Liddy’s speech 
on the cruise ship, whose national flag was not made part of the record, 
occurred when that ship was not within the navigable waters of any 
state.  Under the circumstances, a federal district court took jurisdiction 
of the case, and the Fourth Circuit concluded that, first, principles of 
American defamation law applied to the action, and, second, that 
“general maritime law,” rather than “the specific law of a single state,” 
would govern it.220  The Fourth Circuit then used the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts as its source of what it called the “general common law tort 
principles” relevant to the defamation claim.  
Wells v. Liddy provides a reminder that not all the areas of designated 
federal interest that remain the province of federal courts after Erie are 
derived from statutes.  The jurisdiction of the federal courts in that case 
was based on their authority over cases arising on navigable waters of 
the United States.  Such “maritime” jurisdiction was not affected by Erie.  
Moreover, the “maritime” law in the case was American defamation law 
in a maritime setting, and therefore federal law.  It was also “general” law 
in the sense that it was not based on the decisions of any particular state. 
                                                 
218 This case was brought to my attention by Caleb Nelson’s article.  See Caleb Nelson, 
The Persistence of General Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503 (2006). 
219 1 F. Supp. 2d 532 (D. Md. 1998). 
220 Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999). 
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In making use of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as its primary source of 
defamation law principles, however, the Fourth Circuit was drawing 
upon the decisions of many states, as the Restatements are offered as 
compilations of the common law of multiple jurisdictions.  “General 
law” in Wells was being used in the first of that term’s original meanings, 
an extrapolation of defamation law principles based on a canvass of 
many sources.  It was indisputably “general federal common law.” 
B. Customary International Law as General Federal Common Law 
Is there any reason to think that the same analysis made in Wells 
could not apply to violations of customary international law in a 
maritime setting?  Assume that instead of a passenger on a cruise ship 
being defamed, that ship was hijacked in the navigable waters of the 
United States by terrorists who temporarily seized control of her, held 
her passengers hostage in various stages of deprivation, and sought to 
bring her into a port friendly to their cause.  The terrorists were 
eventually intercepted and arrested by authorities.  Several passengers 
for the ship, some of them aliens and others U.S. citizens, brought tort 
claims in American federal courts as a result of the incident.  Some were 
against the terrorists for piracy, false imprisonment, assault, and battery, 
amounting to torture and intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
while others were against the cruise line for negligence, resulting in 
emotional distress, and for not providing proper security against 
terrorist attacks. 
Consider, first, claims by alien passengers against terrorists, which 
would be brought under the ATS.  The Sosa decision makes it clear that 
federal courts can, in attempting to determine whether torts in violation 
of the law of nations have been committed, engage in the sort of canvass 
of sources from multiple jurisdictions traditionally associated with 
“general law” inquiries. 221   To determine “the current state of 
international law,” they can look at the “customs and usages of civilized 
nations” and the work of commentators. 222   Indeed the approach 
endorsed by the Sosa Court appears identical to that described in a 1900 
case, The Paquete Habana, in which the Court assumed that customary 
international law was a species of “general law.”223  So it seems fair to 
characterize the customary international law norms gleaned by federal 
                                                 
221 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2766 (2004) (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 
U.S. 677, 700 (1900)). 
222 Id. 
223 Id. at 2767. 
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courts in their efforts to define torts in violation of the law of nations 
under the ATS as sources of general federal common law principles.224 
Now suppose that other passengers, American citizens, chose to sue 
terrorists in federal court for torts arising out of the incident.  Some of 
their claims might be conceptualized as torts in violation of the law of 
nations because the action of the terrorists amounted to piracy or 
assaults that rose to the level of torture.  Sosa did not definitively resolve 
the question of whether such claims could be brought in the federal 
courts without the benefit of the ATS; however, at one point in his Sosa 
opinion Justice Souter stated that violations of “international law norms” 
could form the basis for “private claims under federal common law.”225 
It is hard to know what Justice Souter had in mind by that comment.  
In the hypothetical presented above, cruise ship passengers injured by 
the hijacking that were American citizens could seek recovery for torts 
directly under domestic tort law, in this instance “general” federal law.  
If the conduct of the hijackers resulted in assaults, batteries, and 
inflictions of emotional distress, those actions would be treated in the 
same manner as the defamation claim in Wells, through a canvass of 
“general” tort law by the federal court in question.  Although torts “in 
violation of the law of nations” would doubtless occur in the course of a 
ship hijacking, they would spawn domestic torts. In addition to assaults 
and batteries, claims against the cruise ship company for negligence in 
providing security against terrorist attacks would fall in that category.  
However, Sosa might nonetheless serve as a precedent under which 
federal courts, in “general common law” cases such as admiralty and 
maritime cases, might include international law sources in their canvass 
of sources.  This might be what Justice Souter was anticipating in his 
comment about international law norms furnishing a basis for private 
damage claims in federal common law cases. 
The principal conclusion to be drawn from the above discussion is 
not that Sosa can be expected to result in an outpouring of cases in which 
customary international norms form the basis for private damage claims 
outside the coverage of the ATS.  Rather, it is that Sosa appears to 
acknowledge that even after Erie, customary international law, as 
applied by the federal courts, can still be a source of common law 
                                                 
224 It is clear that the Sosa Court was treating ATS-based inquiries into the scope and 
content of torts in violation of the law of nations as exercises in interpreting federal law.  Id. 
at 2765. 
225 Id. 
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decisions, and as such, has the potential to function as federal general 
common law.  However, this does not end the possible complexities lying 
behind the door Sosa chose to leave ajar.  Because of the discernible 
federal interest in the adherence to and application of internationally 
accepted norms of conduct, decisions in which customary international 
norms are applied by federal courts might not only be conceptualized as 
federal common law decisions, but as binding on state courts as well. 226 
C. Customary International Law as State Common Law 
Thus, the question of whether customary international law decisions 
by the federal courts should be treated as not fully governed by Erie 
necessarily requires attention to the status of those decisions as state law.  
There is no question that state courts can take cognizance of disputes in 
which issues of customary international law are raised, and with 
globalization, one might expect that an increasing number of such 
disputes may appear in state courts in the future.227  The question is how, 
in a post-Erie universe, those decisions should be regarded.  Recently 
scholars have been sharply divided on this issue, with some arguing that 
customary international law decisions should, notwithstanding Erie, be 
regarded as federal law,228 while others maintain that the Erie decision, 
separation-of-powers, and federalism concerns require that customary 
international law be regarded as state law, even if comparatively few 
state courts might be expected to pass on customary international law 
issues.229 
This debate again highlights some of the concerns that led the Erie 
decision to declare the illegitimacy of a general federal common law that 
was independent of the common law decisions of the states.  One 
concern was that the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, standing 
alone, did not give those courts power to make law in areas where 
Congress could not act.  Another was that federal common law rules, 
where they did not follow the rules of the state in which the federal court 
                                                 
226 This issue has regularly been raised in commentary on the status of customary 
international law after Erie.  See Young, supra note 194, at 382-83. 
227 For example, in construing a section of the Oregon Constitution as applied to the 
treatment of prisoners in state jails, the Oregon Supreme Court derived a norm of fair 
treatment from the United Nations’ Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of 
Prisoners.  See Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123, 131 (Or. 1981). 
228 See, e.g., Koh, supra note 1, at 1825; Harold Hongju Koh, The Supreme Court Meets 
International Law, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1 (2004). 
229 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, supra note 22, at 815; Curtis A. Bradley 
& Jack L. Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy of Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 
319 (1997). 
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sat, would undermine uniformity in the application of state law.  Neither 
of those concerns seems applicable to customary international law 
decisions. 
At the time Erie was decided, the power of Congress to regulate 
areas of the economy under the Commerce Clause was hotly contested, 
and it was assumed that a significant number of intrinsically “local” 
activities existed that remained within the regulatory powers of the 
states.230  Although Congress very likely did have power to make rules 
for right of ways near railroad tracks when the railroad traffic on those 
tracks crossed state lines (as was the case in Erie), Justice Brandeis’s 
assumption that large areas of state tort law remained outside the 
regulatory province of the federal government was probably accurate in 
1938.  However, five years later, Wickard v. Filburn231 extended the reach 
of the federal government’s commerce powers to include the regulation 
of wheat designed for consumption by an individual farmer in his home.  
Recent Supreme Court decisions have signaled that some limits on the 
regulatory powers of Congress remain,232 but it seems fair to say that 
Justice Brandeis’s concern that the federal courts might invade areas of 
state power where Congress could not is less likely to materialize. 
Moreover, customary international law issues traditionally surfaced 
in federal rather than state courts, and the federal government, as 
opposed to the states, was typically seen as entrusted with foreign 
relations powers.  Indeed the ATS was itself an example of the assumed 
power of Congress to pass statutes governing international law issues. 
Thus, even if the idea of certain “local” activities remaining immune 
from federal regulation retains some cogency, activities affecting 
international relations would seem to be far from intrinsically local.  
If one assumes that international relations is an abiding concern of 
the federal government, the uniformity concern would appear to point in 
favor of federal courts retaining power to fashion rules of customary 
international law after Erie.  Were Erie principles applied to customary 
international law cases, state courts would be free to develop their own 
customary international law rules, and federal courts would be bound by 
state decisions.  This would hardly promote uniformity, especially 
because the state decisions would be unreviewable by the Supreme 
                                                 
230 A classic example is Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
231 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
232 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 
898 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 
144 (1992). 
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Court of the United States.  Such a result seems perverse in two respects.  
Courts not traditionally engaged with customary international law cases 
would end up being the primary decision-makers in the area, and the 
possibility for multiple, competing state rules might exist, making it 
more difficult for the federal government to maintain a uniform 
approach to customary international law issues. 
A final concern, elegantly expressed by Curtis Bradley and Jack 
Goldsmith, is the risk that allowing the federal courts to develop 
customary international law rules through a broad canvass of the 
attitudes of international organizations and jurists will result in 
unelected officials imposing their will on the citizens of states.233  In the 
death penalty area, for example, if a federal court were to find the death 
penalty inconsistent with international norms of conduct, the result 
would be a principle of “new” federal customary international law that 
bound the states, even if a majority of the citizens of a state had voted to 
retain the death penalty for certain crimes.  This seems, at first blush, to 
raise issues of democratic theory. 
But would making customary international law state law be 
responsive to the democracy concern?  Some state judges are unelected, 
and even where a state elected its judiciary, the result of a state court’s 
invalidating the death penalty by appeal to international norms would, 
where the state’s legislature had approved the death penalty, raise 
similar democracy concerns.  It would seem that the remedy would lie in 
a cautious interpretation by courts of international norms as the source 
of customary international law rules, something akin to the narrow view 
of “torts . . . in violation of the law of nations” advanced by the Court in 
Sosa.  This would seem particularly true where the views of international 
jurists, conventions, or organizations seem to differ from those of 
American courts or legislatures, or where Congress has specified 
reservations in ratifying the United States participation in an 
international treaty or convention. 
To summarize, the democracy concern does not seem to be alleviated 
by making state rather than federal courts the principal sources of 
customary international law rules, and the separation of powers, 
federalism, and uniformity concerns each seem better facilitated by 
retaining customary international law as a species of federal common 
law.  Here the clumsiness of Erie’s attack on “general federal common 
law” seems most apparent.  Not all the areas of a “unique and distinctive 
                                                 
233 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 22, at 871-76. 
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federal interest” that remain after Erie have been created by federal 
statutes.  Some, such as admiralty and maritime law, are survivors of the 
older regime of general federal common law.  Whatever one thinks of the 
jurisprudential intelligibility of general law as a source of immanent 
principles to be found and applied by judges, the term has another 
meaning that retains its intelligibility, that of a canvass of rules 
embodied in the decisions of multiple sources.  That seems to be the 
most accurate description of customary international law today:  it is 
general law.   
But it does not follow that customary international law should be 
regarded as exclusively federal common law.  Its history more resembles 
that of the law merchant than that of admiralty or maritime law.  Article 
III of the Constitution gives the federal courts jurisdiction over all cases 
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, anticipating that the common 
law of those subjects would be determined by federal judges.234  There 
were, however, no “law merchant” or “law of nations” clauses in Article 
III, and in the nineteenth-century customary international law and law 
merchant cases were decided in both state and federal courts.235  Swift v. 
Tyson suggested that most law merchant cases should be treated as 
“federal common law” cases, but it did not preclude state courts from 
deciding those cases.  The analysis above suggests that, in many cases, 
customary international law disputes may implicate federal interests.  As 
such, using Erie to prevent the federal courts from deciding customary 
international law cases on their own is not sensible.  However, it is 
difficult to argue that customary international law cases are invariably 
ones in which the interests of the federal government are unique and 
distinctive.  If a state court wanted to consider conditions in the state’s 
prison system against the backdrop of a state constitutional provision 
requiring “humane” treatment for prisoners, it seems difficult to imagine 
that a federal court’s interpretation of customary international norms 
about fair treatment should control that inquiry.  
Thus, I think the proper way to conceive customary international 
law is as “general” law that might be the source of both federal and state 
common law rules.236  Given the fact that an overwhelming number of 
                                                 
234 This was true even with the “savings clause” of the Judiciary Act of 1789.  That clause 
distinguished between “common law” remedies (when the action involved persons 
connected with a ship) and “admiralty” remedies, which were not available in state courts. 
235 See Koh, supra note 1, at 1830. 
236 I do not take the Sosa Court’s statement, quoted at note 138, that violations of 
international norms can be made the basis of “private damage claims under federal 
common law” to have precluded any future state court adjudication of such claims.  I 
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customary international law cases have been brought in the federal 
courts, and given the states’ rudimentary interests compared to that of 
the federal government in international relations issues, it seems likely 
that if Erie were treated as not precluding independent customary 
international law decisions by federal courts, those decisions would 
dominate.  But I would stop short of making those decisions preemptive 
of state law.  Customary international law should remain a pocket of 
general law, both federal and state, on which Erie has no effect.  As such, 
it would expose Justice Brandeis’s dictum that there is no general federal 
common law as partially misplaced, but at the same time would not 
require that customary international law decisions, once made by the 
federal courts, be treated as “new,” binding federal common law.237 
V.  CONCLUSION: THE STATUS OF A CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF 
TORTS 
The status of customary international torts actions outside the 
parameters of the ATS, although left open by the Court in Sosa, doubtless 
contributed to the Sosa Court’s caution in defining torts in violation of 
the law of nations.  The reasons for the Court’s caution seem obvious: a 
fear of reviving pre-Erie “general” law in the form of the customs and 
practices of civilized nations, a fear of creating too broad a forum for tort 
actions involving aliens in American courts, and a fear of opening up 
changing international norms as too broad a source of law in domestic 
cases. 
All of this suggests that customary international law is unlikely to be 
drawn upon very often as a source of tort rules for the federal courts.  I 
do not lament that prospect.  The increased globalization of the economy 
and the tendency of tort litigation to reflect the changing ways in which 
humans can injure themselves and others augurs a potentially dramatic 
                                                                                                             
interpret that statement as only stating that, in future ATS cases, courts can themselves 
look to international norms in determining the content of torts in violation of the law of 
nations.  It seems clear that in the ATS context, the Court regards customary international 
law as “new” federal common law, but there is no indication that it regards customary 
international law as federal common law in all contexts. 
237 This position follows one advanced by Ernest Young.  See Young, supra note 194, at 
467-99. Young argues that there should be no “single appellate authority whose 
interpretations of customary [international] norms would bind the state courts.”  Id. at 497.  
It might be objected that this approach would introduce a proliferation of different federal 
and state customary international law rules.  I doubt that this would occur for two reasons.  
First, I believe the overwhelming number of cases raising customary international law 
issues would continue to be brought in the federal courts.  Second, I would hope (and 
perhaps expect) that other courts would follow the Sosa pattern of applying customary 
international law norms sparingly to disputes in American courts. 
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expansion of torts without borders.  The growing interest on the part of 
international bodies in articulating universal norms of conduct might 
tempt the international community to broaden the definition of conduct 
condemned by civilized nations to encompass such torts.  I do not think 
that the increased risk of injury that accompanies globalization should be 
treated as a mandate to infuse tort jurisprudence with the norms of 
customary international law.  I especially do not think that American 
federal courts should hold themselves out as receptive to that prospect.  
There are enough fortuities in the process by which internationally based 
tort cases end up in the federal courts of the United States for those 
courts to be circumspect in their consultation of international sources. 
As to state courts, commentators have noted that few customary 
international law cases of any kind have been brought in state 
jurisdictions.  This situation might change with globalization, and I have 
argued that, to the extent that the content of customary international law 
as “general” law more resembles the law merchant than admiralty or 
maritime law, state courts can contribute to its development, whether in 
the area of torts or other common law areas, without having to follow 
the decisions of federal courts.  Here again, prudence seems to be called 
for, especially if one anticipates that increased state court activity might 
foster a proliferation of diverse “parochial” state customary international 
law decisions. 
However, the question of whether it would be prudent for American 
federal or state courts to begin to develop a customary international law 
of torts is different from the question of whether they are permitted to do 
so.  Here it is a mistake to read Erie as a bar to the promulgation of 
“general” customary international law by the federal courts, and also a 
mistake to treat customary international law as “new” federal common 
law.  In short, we have a customary international law of torts, a survival 
of “general” law in a post-Erie world.  The federal courts have the 
capacity to develop rules in tort cases where norms of customary 
international law are implicated that might deviate from state tort rules.  
State courts also have a similar capacity. 
But the very possibility that more torts cases can be expected to have 
an international setting, when combined with the increased political and 
cultural diversity of international contacts, cautions against too ready an 
acceptance in American courts of arguments that tortious conduct can be 
governed by international norms.  It may have been this instinctive sense 
of getting into delicate and troubled waters that encouraged the Supreme 
Court to hold back in Sosa; and it may be that this prudential caution, 
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rather than the historical and jurisprudential reasons advanced by the 
Court for its decision, will come to be understood as the principal 
message of the Sosa case.  In any event, we need to get beyond the 
potential conundrum raised by the interaction of Erie and Sosa, and see a 
customary international law of torts for what it is, however narrow or 
spacious its domain might be. 
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